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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The JOBS Act of 2012 established the regulatory infrastructure for crowdfunding 
platforms to offer securities to the public. The institutional framework of securities-based 
crowdfunding platforms adopts aspects of venture capital and rewards-based crowdfunding 
markets, with startups offering rewards in addition to equity. Using an experiment, I investigate 
whether a certain type of reward, which I call a recognition reward, tends to attract a narcissistic 
investor base, which, in turn, leads to an increase in a startup’s social media presence. I provide 
evidence that higher levels of narcissism are associated with a higher value being placed on 
recognition rewards. In addition, I find that narcissists are more likely to post about their 
investment on social media, and that this is especially true when rewards are offered. A 
simulation analysis suggests that offering recognition rewards increases the chances that a 
crowdfunding campaign will be funded and that its investors will post about it on social media. 
Since higher levels of narcissism are associated with a greater number of friends and followers 
on social media websites, the simulation also shows that more people are likely to be exposed to 
the crowdfunding campaign when recognition rewards are offered to investors. Social media 
exposure allows crowdfunding campaigns to gain attention via social media without violating the 
restrictions placed on general solicitation, and may also lead to increased advertisement of their 
products after a campaign is completed. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates whether a crowdfunding campaign can increase its chances of 
success by offering recognition rewards, which are particularly attractive to more narcissistic 
investors. There are two means by which recognition rewards increase the chances of a 
successful crowdfunding campaign. First, they increase investment amounts as some investors, 
especially more narcissistic investors, value recognition. Second, they increase social media 
shares about the crowdfunding campaign, particularly among more narcissistic investors. 
 I define a recognition reward as any reward that provides investors with social praise or 
recognition, and has some degree of exclusivity. To date, crowdfunding startups have offered a 
variety of recognition rewards, including placing investors’ names and pictures in a founders’ 
hall of fame, offering an exclusive dinner with the startup’s executives, providing investors with 
a red-carpet experience, or giving investors a spot in the credits of a video game. Recognition 
rewards can be an attractive reward for startups to offer investors because they often require little 
to no cash outlay from the startup. 
There are two main reasons for investigating whether recognition rewards are more 
attractive to narcissistic investors. One, prior crowdfunding research has explicitly called for 
research into how rewards influence investors’ investment decisions (Ahlers, Cumming, 
Günther, and Schweizer 2015).  Furthermore, observational studies find that the offering of 
recognition rewards is correlated with a decrease in a rewards-based crowdfunding campaign’s 
success (Colombo, Franzoni, and Rossi-Lamastra 2014).  Although it is unclear why recognition 
rewards decrease the success of rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns, it is possible that 
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contributors are motivated by the ability to appear generous when contributing to a 
crowdfunding campaign for which they receive no equity. If that is the case, then recognition 
rewards, which are self-serving, may crowd out motivations to appear generous (cf. Ariely et al 
2009).  It is therefore interesting to know if experimental evidence will show that offering 
recognition rewards will increase investment amounts provided by potential investors in an 
equity-based crowdfunding setting, where generosity is unlikely to be a motivating factor in 
investors’ investment decisions. If so, recognition rewards offer a useful tool for startups to 
attract investors and lower their cost of capital when conducting a crowdfunding campaign.  
Second, prior research indicates that higher narcissism is associated with increased activity on 
social media (Buffardi & Campbell, 2008) and that social media activity is crucial to the success 
of a crowdfunding campaign (Hui, Gerber, & Gergle, 2014; Mollick, 2013; Thies, Wessel, & 
Benlian, 2014). Therefore, recognition rewards may have a secondary benefit in increasing 
startups’ social media presence both during and after a crowdfunding campaign.  
I use an experiment to test my theory for several reasons. The most significant reason is 
that there is no data available for the personalities of investors that have provided capital to real-
world startups.  While archival researchers have developed and validated several measures of 
CEO narcissism (e.g. prominence in annual reports, prominence in press releases, use of first-
person singular pronouns, and compensation relative to other executives; see Chatterjee and 
Hambrick 2007), these measures do not have any obvious analog for investors. Furthermore, I 
was unable to find any publicly available databases of securities-based crowdfunding campaigns 
that offered rewards. 
To test whether recognition rewards are more attractive to investors with higher 
narcissism, I use three experiments.  The first experiment establishes that narcissism increases 
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the attractiveness of recognition rewards. The second experiment replicates the first and extends 
it by confirming that more narcissistic investors are more willing to post on social media about 
the crowdfunding campaign, especially when rewards are offered. The third experiment uses a 
within subject manipulation to confirm that investors interested in recognition rewards do not 
increase their investment amounts by only enough to meet the reward threshold that must be met 
or exceeded in order for an investor to receive the recognition reward, confirming the validity of 
the conclusions drawn from experiments one and two. The third experiment also confirms that 
more narcissistic investors place a higher value on recognition rewards. 
The first experiment uses a 2x1 design that manipulates the reward threshold that must 
be met or exceeded in order for investors to receive the recognition reward. The recognition 
reward gives investors a spot in the startup’s founders’ hall of fame, which includes the names 
and pictures of all qualifying investors. In addition to manipulating the reward threshold, I also 
measure narcissism using the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 1981). I test my 
theory by using an ANOVA model (i.e. a 2x2 ANOVA with one measured and one manipulated 
variable) to show that narcissism increases investors’ willingness to increase their investment 
amounts in response to a higher threshold that must be met or exceeded in order to receive the 
recognition reward.   
The second experiment replicates and extends the results of the first. The replication is 
under slightly different conditions. Firstly, it uses a 2x1 design that varies whether there is a 
reward or no reward, as opposed to having rewards offered in both conditions and manipulating 
the reward threshold. Secondly, it features a crowdfunding campaign that has yet to attract any 
investors. An ANOVA model with contrast coding confirms that narcissism increases investors’ 
willingness to increase their investment amounts solely to receive a recognition reward. 
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Furthermore, contrast coding confirms that narcissism increases investors’ willingness to post on 
social media about the crowdfunding campaign, especially when a campaign offers a recognition 
reward. 
The third experiment replicates the results of the first two on a within subjects basis. The 
main purpose of the third experiment is to confirm that investors do not only increase their 
investment amounts so that they can met the reward threshold. Instead, investors interested in 
the recognition reward will often increase their investment amounts so that they can exceed the 
reward threshold. This confirms the appropriateness of the data analyses that I use for the first 
two experiments.  Furthermore, the third experiment provides a third replication of my main 
findings, but on a within subjects basis. 
In addition to my main analyses, I also run simulations that suggest that offering a 
recognition reward can increase both the probability that a startup will be funded, and the 
startup’s presence on social networking sites. As a first-order effect, rewards increase the amount 
of investment into a startup for a fixed number of page views. In addition, rewards increase the 
expected number of Facebook and Twitter posts about the crowdfunding campaign. The latter 
leads to a second-order effect in which rewards drive more investment by directing additional 
investors to a crowdfunding campaign’s webpage. For the parameter values in my experiment 
and simulation, both effects are quite large. For instance, for 30 webpage views, the first-order 
effect alone increases the probability that a campaign will be funded by 277%. For between one 
and eight webpage views, the second order-effect leads to a 24% and 32% increase in expected 
Facebook and Twitter views, respectively.  
 My research yields both practical and theoretical insights. First, my research has 
implications for startups structuring a crowdfunding campaign. Offering recognition rewards not 
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only increases investment, but also attracts investors that are more active on social media 
platforms and have a larger number of friends and followers (Buffardi & Campbell, 2008). This 
latter effect contributes to the spread of information concerning a startup’s crowdfunding 
campaign. A caveat to the upside of offering recognition rewards is that narcissism is associated 
with several undesirable traits and behaviors (e.g. increased willingness to engage in unethical 
behavior) that could be important if the investor base has significant voting rights. Second, my 
research sheds light on some of the non-monetary factors that motivate investors’ decision 
making. I show that some investors derive utility from being associated with an investment 
because it can bring social praise or status (cf. Belleflame et al., 2014). This motivating factor 
likely extends to other forms of investment and may not require a company to explicitly offer 
recognition rewards. That is, some forms of investment may offer exclusivity or the possibility of 
recognition merely from owning a particular asset (e.g. for being an early or particularly keen 
investor). 
I proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I discuss the background of crowdfunding and its 
current regulatory status before outlining my theory and hypothesis. In Chapter 3, I discuss my 
first experiment. In Chapter 4, I discuss my second and third experiments. In Chapter 5, I discuss 
my simulation analyses.  I conclude in Chapter 5.
6 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
BACKGROUND, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Background 
 Equity-based crowdfunding has roots in rewards-based and donation-based 
crowdfunding. ArtistShare is credited as the first crowdfunding platform (see Freedman and 
Nutting 2014 for an excellent history of crowdfunding).i ArtistShare launched in 2003 and its 
success led to several other rewards-based crowdfunding platforms, e.g. Kickstarter and 
Indiegogo. These new platforms opened crowdfunding up to a much larger group of 
entrepreneurs and investors. Kickstarter and Indigogo campaigns offer backers (i.e. investors) a 
variety of rewards for providing capital, including products, services, and recognition rewards.  
 The success of rewards-based crowdfunding was due, in part, to its offering low 
transactions costs and the ability for campaigns to advertise. However, the very things that made 
crowdfunding attractive as a source of capital (e.g. the more relaxed disclosure requirements and 
ability to freely solicit investments) legally prohibited it from being used to offer debt or equity. 
Despite the growth of rewards-based crowdfunding, around 2008, entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists were claiming that the United States faced an “IPO crisis” (e.g. Weild & Kim, 2008).  
After the year 2000, yearly IPOs dropped by almost 70% with small cap firms being 
disproportionately affected. Commentators provided several reasons for the drop, including the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Gao, Ritter, & Zhu, 2013). In  2011, the SEC established an IPO task force 
to investigate how to increase IPOs, with heavy emphasis on the ability of emerging companies 
to create jobs (IPO Task Force 2011). A bill soon appeared that received heavy support from 
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entrepreneurs, investors and politicians. Undoubtedly aided by a clever acronym, the JOBS Bill 
received bipartisan support and was signed into law by President Obama in 2012. 
 Part of the JOBS Act seeks to make crowdfunding more widely available. The Act 
institutes broad changes to the capital market structure for small cap firms. First, it lifts the 
longstanding ban on general solicitation implemented by the Securities Act of 1933. Second, it 
allows startup firms to use crowdfunding platforms to raise up to $1 million in capital per year 
from both accredited and non-accredited investors.  Firms utilizing crowdfunding are required to 
disclose a business plan and GAAP financial statements (an audit is only required for firms 
raising greater than $500,000 in one year). 
 According to the Wall Street Journal, the Act has quickly increased IPOs in America 
(Case, 2014). Investment platforms such as AngelList, Bolstr, CircleUp, EquityNet, and 
MicroVentures have many active investors and a large variety of investment opportunities for 
accredited investors. Since the JOBS Act went into effect, over $393 million was raised using 
crowdfunding with $90 million occurring in the first quarter of 2014. Total growth in equity-
based crowdfunding is expected to be 100% for 2014, and growth is expected to increase 
drastically once non-accredited investors are allowed access to crowdfunding investments 
(Caldbeck, 2014). 
 There are several features of crowdfunding that are important to my study. First, 
crowdfunding campaigns do not receive any funds unless the entire amount of capital that they 
request is successfully raised within a predetermined length of time. Second, an important 
mechanism by which crowdfunding campaigns receive attention is social media interaction. 
Taken together, these features of crowdfunding suggest that it is important for a campaign to 
attract investors that are interested in broadcasting both the crowdfunding campaign as well as 
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the product the campaigning startup seeks to offer. I investigate whether offering recognition 
rewards attracts investors with a personality type that is known to be associated with a larger 
social network (e.g. more Facebook friends) and increased activity on social media (Buffardi & 
Campbell, 2008). 
Theory and hypotheses 
Raskin and Terry (1988) define the trait of narcissism as “self-admiration that is 
characterized by tendencies towards grandiose ideas, fantasized talents, exhibitionism, and 
defensiveness in response to criticism; interpersonal relationships are characterized by feelings 
of entitlement, exploitativeness, and a lack of empathy”. Narcissism is believed to increase 
sensitivity to social praise (e.g. Chatterjee, & Hambrick, 2011; Hales, Hobson, & Resutek, 
2012), increase effort when an audience is observing one’s performance (Wallace & Baumeister, 
2002), and lead to the need to receive confirmation of a grandiose self-image (Morf & 
Rhodewalt, 2001).  
It is also worth mentioning that narcissism is associated with several undesirable traits; 
for example it is believed to increase overconfidence and decrease sensitivity to feedback when 
predicting future performance (Campbell et al., 2004) and increase willingness to engage in 
unethical behavior (Campbell et al., 2011; Judge et al. 2006; Hales et al., 2012). Prior research in 
accounting suggests narcissism increases misreporting (Hales et al., 2012; Schrand & Zechman, 
2012) and that auditors give higher fraud risk assessments when management’s narcissism is 
relatively higher (Johnson et al., 2013).  
Examining the questions on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory-40 (NPI-40) gives 
insight into the personality of individuals with a high NPI score (see Appendix B, C or D). For 
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instance, one question asks whether subjects like to look at themselves in the mirror (Q29) and 
others ask whether they like to be the center of attention (Q30; Q7). These questions are meant to 
narcissism components of vanity and exhibitionism, respectively. Other questions ask about an 
individual’s desire for power (e.g. Q27) or their beliefs about their self-importance (e.g. Q9). 
Together, these questions are meant to capture the construct of narcissism as well as its 
components, which include authority, entitlement, exhibitionism, exploitativeness, self-
sufficiency, superiority, and vanity. 
An individual’s NPI score is thought to capture a stable personality trait that predicts his 
or her motivations and behaviors. Key in my setting is an individual’s motivation to enhance his 
or her self-image, or receive social praise and status. Being associated with a successful startup 
and having objective proof of early involvement (e.g. name and picture in the founders’ hall of 
fame; name in movie or video game credits) may give investors bragging rights that can enhance 
their self-image and social status. Since higher levels of narcissism are associated with an 
increased need to seek self-affirmation, it is likely that higher narcissism will translate into a 
higher value being placed on recognition rewards, which may fulfill the need for self-affirmation 
(Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). In addition, prior research shows that CEO’s narcissism correlates 
with corporate social responsibility investment that brings attention and image reinforcement, but 
lower return on investment (Patrenko, Aime, Ridge and Hill 2015). Similarly, consumer behavior 
research suggests that narcissists engage in more conspicuous consumption (Cisek et al 2014). In 
particular, narcissists purchase “high-prestige products (i.e. luxurious, exclusive, flashy), show 
greater interest in the symbolic rather than utilitarian value of products, and distinguish 
themselves positively from others via their materialistic possessions” (Cisek et al 2014).  
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Therefore, the prospect of receiving a recognition reward may motivate investors to increase 
their investment amounts in order to exceed the threshold necessary for receiving the reward.ii  
It is possible, however, that higher narcissism does not lead investors to increase their 
investment amounts in response to recognition rewards. Although being associated with a 
successful startup can bring an investor social praise and recognition, being associated with a 
startup that is not successful can lead to the opposite effect. Since narcissism increases a person’s 
interest in social recognition and praise, it is possible that higher narcissists do not want to risk 
having their name associated with a risky startup that can potentially damage their image by 
negatively distinguish them from others. However, it is likely possible for a narcissist to control 
the information associated with him or her through strategic management of his or her social 
media accounts.   
As a whole, it is likely that higher narcissism will lead to an increased interest in 
recognition rewards which, in turn, will translate into higher investment amounts so that 
investors’ can qualify for a recognition reward. This leads to my first set of hypotheses (see 
Figure 1a and 2a for a graphical presentation): 
H1a:  Narcissism increases the value of a recognition reward, which will increase investors’ 
willingness to increase their investment amounts in response to a higher threshold that must be 
met or exceeded in order to receive the recognition reward. 
H1b:  Narcissism increases the value of a recognition reward, which will increase investors’ 
willingness to increase their investment amounts in response to a reward being offered. 
 In addition to increasing the value of a recognition reward, narcissism may also impact 
investors’ willingness to share information on social media about a crowdfunding campaign. 
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Prior research has shown that narcissism increases activity on social media, partly because of 
narcissists’ need to draw attention to themselves (Davenport et al. 2014). This need leads 
narcissists to have more Facebook friends and Twitter followers, and be more active users of 
social media (Bergman et al. 2011; Carpenter 2012; Ong et al. 2011; Davenport et al. 2014). 
Given a higher base-rate of participation in social media, one can expect narcissism to increase 
the likelihood that an investors will make a social media post related to their investment. In 
addition, narcissists will likely desire to broadcast on social media their receiving of a 
recognition reward. This behavior can serve as the means by which narcissists receive the 
recognition, social praise, and positive distinction that they seek by investing enough in a 
crowdfunding campaign in order to receive a recognition reward. Furthermore, narcissistic 
investors who do not receive a recognition reward may also want to share information about the 
opportunity for others to receive the social praise and recognition that they so desire, even when 
they themselves do not receive the recognition.  This leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2:  Narcissism will increase the willingness of investors to post about a crowdfunding 
campaign on social media, especially when the campaign offers recognition rewards. 
Collectively, my hypotheses suggest that offering recognition rewards can increase the 
probability of a crowdfunding campaign’s success through two mechanisms. First, recognition 
rewards increase investment amounts, particularly for more narcissistic investors. Second, 
recognition rewards increase the social media presence of a crowdfunding campaign because 
investors are more likely to post about their investment when recognition rewards are offered. 
Postings on social media made by investors with “skin in the game” have been shown to be 
especially important for a crowdfunding campaign’s success (Moritz and Block 2016). I 
therefore use simulation analysis to investigate how offering recognition rewards can increase 
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the social media presence of a crowdfunding campaign and how they increase the probability of 
a campaign’s success through higher investment amounts. The simulation analysis aims to 
quantify the magnitude of the first- and second-order effects of offering recognition rewards. 
i Interestingly, ArtistShare’s first crowdfunding campaign offered recognition rewards in the form of credits on an 
albums booklet, with one fan that made a $10,000 investment being listed as executive producer (Freedman & 
Nutting, 2014). 
ii A priori, it is reasonable to hypothesize that certain reward thresholds can decrease investment amounts. This 
would occur when investors are willing to increase their investment amounts to exceed a fairly low reward 
threshold, but are not willing to do so when the reward threshold is very high. A careful examination of pilot data 
obtained for a related project allowed me to pick reward thresholds that made this pattern unlikely to occur. See my 
experimental design in Appendices B, C and D. 
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CHAPTER 3:   
EXPERIMENT ONE 
 In this section, I present the design of and results from my first experiment, which is 
designed to test H1a. 
Design and participants 
 My first experiment uses a 2x1 design that manipulates on a between-subjects basis the 
dollar threshold that must be exceeded for investors to qualify for the recognition reward. By 
increasing the threshold that must be exceeded for investors to quality for the recognition reward, 
I can test my prediction that higher levels of narcissism are associated with a higher level of 
value from recognition rewards. Although it may seem simpler to manipulate the presence vs 
absence of the reward, I chose to instead manipulate the reward threshold because including 
rewards in both conditions allows me to obtain measures of participants’ perceptions of the 
reward and other mediating variables for both experimental conditions. This allows me to test for 
mediation and gain insight into the process behind investors’ decision making. However, I 
follow-up my first experiment with a second experiment that manipulates the presence versus 
absence of rewards to confirm the robustness of my results. It is also important to mention that I 
chose not to compare recognition rewards to other types of rewards as other types of rewards 
may be valuable to investors and it is difficult to predict a priori how they will compare to 
recognition rewards. Furthermore, it is likely that recognition rewards will remain attractive to 
investors even if more than one type of reward is offered by the startup. 
 In addition to manipulating the reward threshold, I also measure subclinical narcissism 
using the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI -40), which is the most commonly used method 
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for assessing subclinical levels of narcissism (Raskin & Terry 1988). The NPI-40 consists of 
forty forced-choice, binary response questions. To calculate a participant’s composite narcissism 
score, I count the number of questions for which the participant gives the more narcissistic 
response.  
 I used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to recruit subjects. This subject pool is 
appropriate for two main reasons. First, the theory I want to test is that narcissism increases the 
value placed on recognition rewards, which increases investors’ willingness to increase their 
investment amounts in response to a higher threshold that must be met or exceeded in order to 
receive a recognition reward. Theory suggests this will occur regardless of investors’ 
sophistication level or the complexity of the investment decision; it is a basic motivation 
affecting investors’ decisions. Second, crowdfunding campaigns will target a broad audience. In 
fact, crowdfunding has been said to harness the “wisdom of crowds” and to “democratize access 
to capital” (e.g. see SEC 2013). This suggests that MTurk users may be more representative of 
crowdfunding investors than MBA students, which are often used as a proxy for nonprofessional 
investors (Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, & Pronk 2007).  
Experimental procedures 
Participants were paid $1.50 to complete an approximately 30 minute experiment. The 
experimental materials were adapted from a real startup company that was successfully funded 
via the UK-based Crowdcube. Basing the materials on a real startup allows for the calibration of 
the instrument to parameter levels and combinations that are realistic and have ecological 
validity. Furthermore, using a successfully funded campaign decreases the probability of finding 
that a substantial number of participants are unwilling to invest in the startup, which could 
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prevent the experiment from detecting that narcissism increases the value placed on recognition 
rewards. 
Before viewing information about the investment opportunity, participants completed a 
short training module on the risks associated with crowdfunding. The latest draft of the SEC’s 
proposed rules on crowdfunding mandates that crowdfunding portals require non-accredited 
investors to complete a similar training module, and the specific questions included in the 
instrument were based off of the training required by UK-based Crowdcube.  
After completing the training module, participants learned more about the startup. 
Throughout the process, participants are asked comprehension check questions that must be 
answered correctly before they can proceed.  To begin, participants are exposed to the main page 
of the startup’s crowdfunding website (see Appendix B). The main page communicates a variety 
of information, including the name of the startup (E-Sign), the current degree of investment 
activity (90 investors have invested $75K), and the target amount for funding set by the startup 
($84K).  The target amount for funding was determined by converting the UK-based E-Sign’s 
target investment amount into US dollars using the spot rate at the time that the experiment was 
designed. Participants were made aware that funding is “all-or-nothing”; that is, the campaign 
will not receive any money unless it meets its target investment amount. 
After viewing the startup’s main crowdfunding campaign webpage, subjects are 
sequentially exposed to the campaign’s disclosures. The first disclosure is an approximately five 
minute video that describes the startup’s product, which is a secure and inexpensive electronic 
signature system. The video was modified to be shorter than the original so as to economize on 
participants’ time and avoid extraneous information.  
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After viewing the video, subjects read the campaign’s disclosure titled “The Idea”. In this 
section, subjects learn more about the product and what problem that it solves. They are also 
made aware that additional funding is needed for app development and the addition of new 
features.  Next, subjects learn more about the market for digital signatures through the 
campaign’s disclosure titled “The Market”. This section outlines the market size as well as the 
major competition in the industry. After that, subjects learn about the management team of E-
Sign, which is a highly skilled team with degrees from the top engineering schools in the world 
(e.g. MIT).iii The next disclosure, titled “The Exit”, outlines E-Sign’s plan and timeline for 
delivering a liquidating dividend to early investors. This disclosure also provides a forecasted 
return that investors would earn if E-sign successfully executes its exit strategy and is either 
bought out by a large company or publicly listed. The forecasted return is based off of the actual 
disclosure made by the real crowdfunding campaign executed by E-Sign. 
Next, participants are told that they will have their name and picture placed in the 
startup’s founders’ hall of fame if their investment meets or exceeds either $3K or $6K, 
depending on the experimental condition to which participants were randomly assigned. I chose 
these threshold values based on pilot data for a related project. I picked the $3K threshold so that 
most investment amounts in my pilot data exceeded the threshold and the $6K threshold so that 
most investment amounts in my pilot data were less than the threshold. The latter choice was 
particularly important as my hypotheses could only be confirmed if the higher threshold 
exceeded what investors would otherwise be willing to invest. 
After learning about the rewards that the campaign offers, investors are exposed to a 
listing of the fifteen most recent investors in E-Sign. Names for the investors were randomly 
generated using a web-based random name generator, while amounts were loosely based off of 
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E-Sign’s actual crowdfunding campaign.  Finally, investors are exposed to E-Sign’s historical 
and forecasted financial statements. I based the financial statements off of what E-Sign’s actual 
crowdfunding campaign disclosed, converted at the spot-rate. 
As stated early, to ensure that participants were paying attention to the materials, I 
required them to answer review questions. They were not allowed to advance through the 
instrument without correctly answering each review question, which insured that they paid 
attention to and understood the investment opportunity.  One review question was about the 
rewards that the startup offered, and was included to give comfort that participants understood 
that the recognition reward was given only to investors with investment amounts exceeding the 
reward threshold. 
Results and test of hypothesis 
To test H1a, I use a two-way ANOVA model of Investment Amount with two categorical 
independent variables to capture both the reward threshold ($3K Threshold=-1 and $6K 
Threshold=1) and the subclinical narcissism level of participants (low-Narc=-1 and high-
Narc=1). Participants are categorized as having low or high narcissism based on whether their 
NPI score exceeds the median in my sample (i.e. is greater than 12). I chose to use a two-way 
ANOVA with a median split to make the results easier to present and interpret.iv  
 Recall, H1a predicts a directional difference in slopes: above median NPI scores will 
have a steeper slope across the reward threshold conditions than will below median NPI scores. 
Importantly, it also predicts that the simple effect of the reward threshold will be positive and 
significant for the high-Narc participants. To test this prediction, I use a one-tailed test of the 
variance explained by the interaction between Narcissism and Reward Threshold.  I also do a 
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follow-up analysis of the simple effect of Reward Threshold given high Narcissism. Descriptive 
statistics for participants’ investment amounts across my four conditions are tabulated in Panel A 
of Table 1, and are directionally consistent with H1a.v For a graphical representation of the 
results, see Figure 1b.  Panel B of Table 1 presents a formal test of H1a and indicates support for 
the hypothesis due to a significant interaction between Reward Threshold and Narcissism (p = 
0.02, one-tailed). Panel C of Table 1 confirms a simple main effect of Reward Threshold given 
high Narcissism (p = 0.02, one-tailed).  
 For completeness, I also report the majority of the additional measures that participants 
provided in experiment one. Table 7 reports the means and standard deviations for the credibility 
of the startup’s disclosures, perceptions of the startup’s riskiness, and a variety of demographic 
measures. 
Supplemental analyses 
 I perform two additional analyses to check the robustness of my results.  First, 
untabulated results using a logit model show that narcissism increases the probability that 
investors will say that they increased their investment amount solely for the purpose of receiving 
a reward.  In addition to asking subjects whether they increased their investment amount to get a 
reward, I also asked them how interested they were in the reward using an 11-point Likert-scale; 
I find that higher levels of narcissism are associated with a higher interest in the reward. 
Collectively, these results give provide comfort that more narcissistic investors place a higher 
value on recognition rewards. 
iii I did not use the educational backgrounds and work history that appeared in the actual E-Sign crowdfunding 
campaign as I did not expect US-based participants to be familiar with UK-based schools and employers.  
iv Results remain unchanged if the dichotomous measure is replaced with a continuous measure. 
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v Visual inspection of the descriptive statistics suggests heteroskadasticity, and Levene’s test confirms by rejecting 
the null hypothesis of equal variances at the 5% level. In a series of untabulated analyses, I confirm all tests of my 
hypotheses are robust to allowing for heterogeneous error variance. I use a wild bootstrap with 1,000 samples and 
both percentile and bias-corrected accelerated confidence intervals. The results indicate all hypotheses are robust 
(i.e. 5% significance is always achieved) to better model specification, except the coefficient on the interaction 
between Vanity and Reward Threshold (which only reaches significance at the 10% level). 
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CHAPTER 4: 
EXPERIMENTS TWO AND THREE 
 In this section, I present my second and third experiments. I first present experiment two, 
which is designed to test the robustness of the first experiment, and to extend it by investigating 
whether narcissistic investors are more willing to share information on social media about their 
investment in the crowdfunding campaign, particularly when they receive a recognition reward. 
Experiment two: design and participants 
 My second experiment uses a 2x1 design that varies whether there is a reward or no 
reward (I set the reward threshold at $5K) on a between-subjects basis. I use the same 
recognition reward as I did in my first experiment (i.e. name and photo in the investors’ hall of 
fame). In addition to manipulating one variable, I measure narcissism using the NPI-40 (Raskin 
& Hall 1981). Finally, I used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to recruit subjects. Subjects 
were paid $1.50 to complete an approximately 30 minute experiment administered via Qualtrics 
Survey Software. For experiment two, I made use of a pre-screening survey that prevents 
participants from completing more than one of my experiments within one year’s time. 
Specifically, participants entered their MTurk worker identification number (ID) into a survey 
that compared the ID to all previous participants’ IDs. If the participant was new, they were 
provided with a password that allowed them access to experiment two. 
Experiment two: instrument, procedures and dependent variables 
The instrument used in experiment two was based off of the instrument used for 
experiment one.  There are four major differences between the two instruments. First, the second 
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experiment uses a crowdfunding campaign that has yet to receive any investment. This allows 
me to test the robustness of the first experiment. Second, I use a control condition in which no 
rewards are offered. Third, I increase the salience of rewards by presenting to participants the 
prospect of a reward immediately prior to their making an investment decision. Finally, I add 
measures related to social media to explicitly test whether or not investors with higher levels of 
narcissism are more likely to post on social media about investing in the crowdfunding 
campaign. The instrument for experiment two is provided in Appendix C. 
Experiment two uses two different dependent variables. The first is a participant’s 
investment amount, which is the amount that they choose to invest in the startup’s crowdfunding 
campaign. The second is social media posts, which is the average of two measures. The first 
measure asks participants how likely they are to post about the crowdfunding campaign on 
Facebook, while the second asks how likely they are to post about the crowdfunding campaign 
on Twitter. Both are measured using 8-point Likert scales anchored on “extremely unlikely” and 
“extremely likely”. 
Experiment two: results 
 I analyze my second experiment as a 2x2 ANOVA that uses one manipulated variable 
(reward versus no reward) and one measured variable (high-Narc versus low-Narc). Panel A of 
Table 2 provides the cell means and standard deviations for investment amounts by condition. 
The cell means are consistent with a reward increasing investment amounts, especially for high-
Narc investors. Although I test my hypotheses using contrast coding, I also present for 
completeness a 2x2 ANOVA model in Panel B of Table 2.  
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 Panel C of Table 2 presents the test of Hypothesis 1b. The contrasts weights used for my 
analysis are presented in Figure 2a. Panel C of Table 2 indicates that the variance accounted for 
by the contrast weights reaches statistical significance at the 0.05-level (p-value = 0.03; one-
tailed). Furthermore, the residual variance (i.e. semi-omnibus test) is far from reaching statistical 
significance (p-value = 0.71; two-tailed), suggesting unqualified support for H1b. 
 Table 3 presents the test of Hypothesis 2, which focuses on participants’ likelihood of 
posting on social media about the crowdfunding campaign. Panel A of Table presents the cell 
means, which are consistent with a reward increasing participants likelihood of posting on social 
media, particularly for high-Narc investors.vi I formally test my hypothesis using contrast coding, 
which can be found in Panel C of Table 3 (see Figure 3a for contrast weights). The contrast 
reaches statistical significance at the 0.05-level (p-value < 0.01; one-tailed), while the residual 
(i.e. semi-omnibus test) is far from statistical significance (p-value = 0.49; two-tailed). This lends 
unqualified support to H2.  
 For completeness, I also provide descriptive statistics for the additional measures 
gathered in experiment two. Table 8 summarizes measures such as the credibility of the startup’s 
disclosures and participants perceptions of the likelihood that the startup will successfully 
execute its exit strategy and the expected return if it does. Finally, the table provides some 
measures related to social media use. 
Experiment three 
 I now present my third experiment, which was designed primarily to confirm the validity 
of the inferences I made in my first two experiments. In those experiments, I used an ANOVA 
model of investors’ investment amounts as opposed to a logistic regression model that models 
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whether or not investors’ investment amounts meet or exceed the threshold necessary for 
receiving the recognition reward. Yet a third way to analyze the data would be to investigate 
whether or not there is a discontinuity in investment amounts that appears at the reward 
threshold. My third experiment verifies that my chosen method of analysis is sensible. 
Specifically, I use a within subjects manipulation to verify that investors often increase their 
investment amounts in order to exceed the reward threshold that must be met or exceeded to 
receive a recognition reward.  
Experiment three: design and participants 
 My third experiment uses a 2x1 design that varies whether there is a reward or no reward 
on a within-subjects basis. The reward threshold is set at $100 higher than what each participant 
says they would have invested in the absence of the reward. This design allows me to determine 
whether investors interested in the recognition reward will only increase their investment 
amounts by $100, or by some amount greater than $100.  In addition to manipulating one 
variable, I also measure narcissism using the NPI-40 (Raskin & Hall 1981). 
I use Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to recruit participants, who are paid $1.50 to complete 
an approximately 30 minute experiment. For experiment three, I made use of a pre-screening 
survey that prevents participants from completing more than one of my experiments within one 
year’s time. Specifically, participants entered their MTurk worker identification number into a 
survey that compared the ID to all previous participants’ IDs. If the participant was new, they 
were provided with a password that allowed them access to experiment three. 
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Instrument, procedures and dependent variables 
 I used an instrument very similar to that of experiments one and two. Like experiment 
one, the crowdfunding campaign used in the instrument had raised $75K of its $84K target. 
However, unlike the prior experiments, participants were not presented with information about 
the opportunity to receive a recognition reward until after they made an initial investment 
decision. After having made their initial investment decision, subjects are provided with 
additional information about the opportunity to receive a recognition reward. The instrument 
personalizes the reward threshold by adding $100 to each participant’s previously elicited 
investment amount. Participants were then asked to modify their decision about how much to 
invest, after they had learned about the opportunity to receive a recognition reward. 
 I measure and analyze two different dependent variables. First, I measure participants’ 
change in investment amounts in response to the presence of a recognition reward with a 
threshold that is $100 above subjects’ initial investment amount (change in Investment Amounts). 
Second, I measure the maximum increase in the investment amount that each participant is 
willing to make in order to qualify for a recognition reward. I refer to this second measure as the 
value of recognition, as it captures the subjective value that participants place on the recognition 
reward. 
Experiment three results 
 Table 9 provides descriptive statistics for the measures that participants provided during 
experiment three.  In addition, Figure 4 in Appendix A provides the distribution of investment 
changes that result from the within-subjects manipulation of experiment three. Although there is 
a mode near $100, it is evident that some participants choose to increase their investment amount 
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by more than the minimum that is necessary to receive a recognition reward. In fact, only 
approximately 58% of subjects who choose to increase their investment amount in order to 
receive the recognition reward increase it by exactly $100. One possible psychological 
explanation for why this occurs is that subjects may not want to be depicted in the recent investor 
list as an investor who only barely met the threshold necessary for receiving the recognition 
reward.  One possible economic explanation for why this occurs is that introducing a recognition 
rewards makes the optimal share of the investment something different than the threshold 
necessary for investors to receive the recognition reward. In fact, this is likely to be the case as a 
recognition reward effects the payoff structure of the investment in such a way that the impact of 
risk aversion is dampened. Overall, the results of experiment three give some comfort that the 
analyses used in experiment one and two were appropriate. 
 Panel B of Table 4 presents a 2x1 ANOVA model of value of recognition. The model 
uses as the explanatory variable a median split of the NPI-40. The results indicate that higher 
levels of narcissism are associated with higher levels of the value of recognition. vii  This is 
consistent with H1b, and serves as a third confirmation of my first hypothesis. Overall, 
experiment three supports the results of experiments one and two.
vi Results are directionally consistent if I use a continuous measure for narcissism, but are only marginally 
significant. 
vii Results are directionally and statistically the same if I use a continuous measure of narcissism. Also, a t-test that 
does not assume equality of variances yields a statistically significant result at the 0.05-level. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
 In this section, I present the results of a simulation analysis aimed at quantifying how large 
of an effect offering a recognition reward has on both the probability of a campaign’s success and 
the number of social media shares that occur along the way to success (or failure).  Throughout 
the analysis, I use data from experiment two, which includes measures of social media activity. 
Description of simulation process 
The simulation models the investment process by assuming that investors arrive at the 
crowdfunding campaign’s webpage sequential and make their investment decision in accordance 
with the empirical probability density function obtained from the experimental data (i.e. it is 
assumed that investment amounts are independent and identically distributed).viii I make the 
simplifying assumption that n investors visit a campaign’s webpage throughout the duration of the 
campaign, and investigate several measures for various n.   
 The first measure used in my simulation is the probability that a crowdfunding campaign 
is successful; that is, the probability that the campaign is fully funded and the startup receives the 
funds that it has asked for. To determine if a campaign is successful, I compare the dollars raised 
by the campaign to the dollars that E-Sign’s actual crowdfunding campaign sought to raise, 
converted at the spot rate at the time the instrument was designed (i.e. $84K). If a simulated 
campaign raises at least $84K, it is deemed a success; otherwise, it is deemed a failure.  
 The second set of measures used in my simulation involve social media activity. For both 
the likelihood of sharing on Facebook and the likelihood of Tweeting, I convert the 8-point Likert 
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scale into a probability by dividing participants’ responses by seven.  Importantly, I set equal to 
zero all values associated with participants who did not make an investment. I do so because prior 
research has shown that social media posts are only important when the poster has “skin in the 
game” (Moritz and Block 2016). I also analyze the number of Facebook friends and Twitter 
followers a post is likely to reach. To estimate this number, I first find the expected number of 
friends/followers from a regression analysis that uses narcissism, a dummy variable for gender, 
and a dummy variable for whether or not the participant owns a smartphone (see Table 5).ix I then 
multiply the number of expected friends and followers by the probability that a participant is 
willing to make a post on Facebook or Twitter, respectively.  The resulting measure is an 
approximation of the expected number of Facebook friends or Twitter followers that are likely to 
view information related to the crowdfunding campaign. 
 Numerical results from the simulation analysis are depicted in Table 6, and a graphical 
depiction of the probability of a successful campaign for various numbers of page views is 
provided in Figure 5.  For page views between one and eight, offering rewards is associated with 
an approximately 24% and 32% increase in Facebook and Twitter users who are potentially 
exposed to a social media post related to the crowdfunding campaign. This difference is driven by 
the increased willingness of investors to share information about the crowdfunding campaign when 
it offers a recognition reward. 
 Turning to the probability of a successful campaign, rewards are shown to have a very large 
first-order impact. For page views between 20 and 55, offering rewards leads to a substantial 
increase in the probability that a campaign will be successful. For instance, when a campaign 
receives 30 page views, it is approximately 277% more likely to be fully funded when it offers a 
recognition reward versus when it does not do so. 
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 Overall, the simulation analysis suggests that offering recognition rewards leads to both 
first-order and second-order effects that greatly benefit a crowdfunding campaign. In terms of the 
former, investors substantially increase their investment amounts in order to qualify for a 
recognition reward. In terms of the latter, a meaningful increase in social media exposure is 
achieved when a crowdfunding campaign offers recognition rewards, which should drive an 
increase in the number of webpage views that a crowdfunding campaign receives.
viii This assumption is likely incorrect, as the investment amounts from experiment one where higher than that of 
experiment two, likely because E-Sign had 90 investors for a total of $75K in experiment one, but no investors in 
experiment two. 
ix In my data set, narcissism is a marginally significant predictor of the number of Facebook friends, but is not a 
statistically significant predictor of Twitter followers.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSION 
 In this study, I use an experiment to show that offering recognition rewards to investors 
for investing in a startup’s crowdfunding campaign can substantially increase investment 
amounts and social media activity driven by narcissistic investors. My theory and results suggest 
that narcissism increases the attractiveness of recognition rewards offered by a startup, and that 
narcissism increases the willingness of investors to share information related to the startup’s 
crowdfunding campaign, particularly when recognition rewards are offered. 
 My study offers practical and theoretical insights. First, recognition rewards motivate 
some investors to increase their investment amounts in order to receive the recognition reward.  
Thus, startups can increase their chance of having a successful crowdfunding campaign with 
minimal effort and little to no cash outlay. Second, given the importance of attracting attention 
via social media both during and after a crowdfunding campaign, startup founders may be 
interested in knowing that offering recognition rewards can change the personality characteristics 
of a startup’s investor base in a way that is likely to lead to more exposure via social media. A 
caveat to this conclusion is that narcissism is also associated with a variety of traits and 
behaviors that are undesirable, e.g. an increased willingness to engage in unethical behavior.  
Startups may want to carefully consider the whether it is optimal to provide investors with voting 
rights if they decide to attract a narcissistic investor base in order to increase their social media 
presence. Finally, my study provides insight into the non-monetary factors that motivate 
investors, namely social praise or recognition. Social praise, recognition, or status may result 
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even when a company does not explicitly offer recognition rewards, but otherwise provides 
exclusivity or the possibility of recognition.  
 My study suggests several avenues for future research. First, it would be interesting to 
examine whether or not higher levels of narcissism lead to higher levels of sharing of 
information associated with a crowdfunded startup after its crowdfunding campaign concludes, 
especially when the narcissist is featured on the startups’ website (e.g. in its founders’ hall of 
fame, credits of the movie/CD/videogame being sold by the startup, etc).  Second, since social 
media users appear to be able to identify higher levels of narcissism in other users (Buffardi & 
Campbell 2008), it is important to understand whether a narcissistic source of information about 
a startup affects how other social media users view that information.  For example, it would be 
interesting to know whether narcissistic investors do a better or worse job at attracting potential 
investors and customers to a crowdfunded startup.  Both of these questions could be addressed 
by using MTurk workers.  For example, one could ask MTurk users whether they would share 
information about a crowdfunded startup after having made an investment.  In addition, one 
could ask MTurk users to provide hypothetical social media posts that are subsequently 
evaluated by other MTurk users for credibility and interestingness. 
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This figure presents a graphical representation of H1. The key prediction is that high 
Narcissism participants will be more responsive to rewards, and therefore will increase their 
investment amounts by an amount larger than do low Narcissism investors when the reward 
threshold is increased from $3K to $6K. 
                       
 
  
 
                    
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
This figure depicts the cells means for participants' investment amounts in Exp 1. This pattern 
is tested using the ANOVA model presented in Table 1. 
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This figure presents H1b along with the hypothesized contrast coding. The key prediciton is 
that higher Narcissism investors will be more responsive to the presence  
of a reward (i.e. will have a line with a steeper slope). 
                       
 
  
 
                    
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
This figure depicts the observed effects for Exp2 H1b, which are tested using contrast coding 
in Table 2. 
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This figure depicts the H2. The key prediction is that higher Narcissism investors will post 
more to social media, and that this will be especially true when a reward is offered. 
 
  
 
                    
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
This figure depicts the cell means (Exp 2) for the average of participants' likelihood of 
posting to Facebook or Twitter about the crowdfunding campaign.  The pattern is tested using 
contrast coding in Table 3. 
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This figure depcits the probability that a campaign will be successful given a fixed 
number of campaign page views. Probabilities are estimated by running 500,000 
hypothetical campaigns in which ivnestment amounts are i.i.d.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypothesis 1
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Investment Amount mean [standard deviation]
Condition $3K Reward 
Threshold
$6K Reward
Threshold
Row
Means
Low Narcissism $2,325.64 $1,873.68 $2,102.60
[$1,646.32] [$2,296.38] [$1,993.54]
n = 39 n = 38 n = 77
High Narcissism $2,022.86 $3,158.97 $2,621.62
[$2,183.37] [$2,766.50] [$2,555.48]
n = 35 n = 39 n = 74
Column Means $2,182.43 $2,524.68
[$1,911.63] [$2,610.06]
n = 74 n = 77
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Investment Amount (using median split)
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value
Reward Threshold 4408765.9 1 4408765.9 0.86 0.35
Narcissism (median split) 9092259.64 1 9092259.64 1.78 0.18
Reward Threshold*Narcissism (median split) 23754323.12 1 23754323.12 4.65 0.02
Error 751024116.4 147 5109007.595
Panel C: Follow-up Tests of Simple Effects
Source of Variation df MS F-stat p-value
Effect of Narcissism given $3K Threshold 1 1691088.9 0.33 0.57
Effect of Narcissism given $6K Threshold 1 31795073.7 6.22 0.01
Effect of Reward Threshold given High Narcissism 1 23809332.15 4.66 0.03
Effect of Reward Threshold given Low Narcissism 1 3931437.33 0.77 0.38
P-values in bold are one-tailed.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypothesis 1
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Investment Amount mean [standard deviation]
Condition $3K Reward 
Threshold
$6K Reward
Threshold
Row
Means
Low Narcissism $2,352.50 $2,616.67 $2,487.80
[$2,572.74] [$3,003.16] [$2,787.42]
n =40 n =42 n =82
High Narcissism $2,420.19 $3,465.93 $2,899.49
[$2,303.54] [$3,237.47] [$2,804.84]
n =52 n =44 n =96
Column Means $2,390.76 $3,051.17
[$2,410.75] [$3,136.07]
n =92 n =86
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Investment Amount (using median split)
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value
Rewards 18903825.15 1 18903825.15 2.44 0.12
Narcissism (median split) 9263341.76 1 9263341.76 1.19 0.28
Rewards*Narcissism (median split) 6729894.15 1 6729894.15 0.87 0.35
Error 1349231314 174 7754202.954
Panel C: Contrast Coding
Source of Variation df MS F-stat p-value
Contrast 29694424.81 1 29694424.81 3.83 0.03
Residual 5264901.63 2 2632450.82 0.34 0.71
Error 1349231314 174 7754202.954
P-values in bold are one-tailed.
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypothesis 2
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Social Media Posts mean [standard deviation]
Condition
Narcissism (median split) $3K Reward 
Threshold
$6K Reward
Threshold
Row
Means
Low Narcissism 0.93 0.84 0.89
[1.70] [1.24] [1.47]
n = 40 n = 42 n = 82
High Narcissism 1.46 2.10 1.75
[1.63] [2.20] [1.93]
n = 52 n = 44 n = 96
Column Means 1.23 1.49
[1.67] [1.90]
n = 92 n = 86
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Social Media Posts (using median split)
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value
Rewards 35.12765172 1 35.12765172 11.76 0.00
Narcissism (median split) 3.35270446 1 3.35270446 1.12 0.29
Rewards*Narcissism (median split) 5.92449663 1 5.92449663 1.98 0.16
Error 519.9233823 174 2.988065416
Panel C: Contrast Coding
Source of Variation df MS F-stat p-value
Contrast 40.07132364 1 40.07 13.41046 0.00
Residual 4.33352917 2 2.17 0.72514 0.49
Error 519.9233823 174 2.988065416
P-values in bold are one-tailed. Social Media Share is the average of an 8-point Likert scale measuring the 
likelihood that participants would post to Facebook or Tweet about the crowdfunding campaign.
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TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypothesis 1
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Value of Recognition mean [standard deviation]
Narcissism (median split)
Low
Narcissism
High
Narcissism
Row
Means
$181.08 $1,021.62 $601.35
[$347.08] [$1,839.25] [$1,380.84]
n = 37 n = 37 n = 74
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Value of Recognition (using median split)
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value
Narcissism (median split) 13070405.4 1 13070405 7.57 0.00
Error 126119460 73 1727663.8
P-values in bold are one-tailed.  Value of Recognition is the maximum amount by which 
participants are willing to increase their investment amounts in order to receive a 
recognition reward.
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TABLE 5
Regression models of Facebook friends and Twitter followers
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - mean [standard deviation]
Low Narcissism High Narcissism
$3K Reward 
Threshold
$6K Reward 
Threshold
$3K Reward 
Threshold
$6K Reward 
Threshold
Facebook Friends 174.73 [182.68] 145.67 [138.30] 417.77 [776.34] 250.02 [259.15]
Twitter Followers 187.23 [701.07] 135.52 [444.22] 251.48 [658.42] 81.23 [162.81]
Panel B: Regression Models
DV = FB Friends DV =  TW Followers
Parameter t-stat Parameter t-stat
Intercept 122.628 1.01 231.521 1.55
Narcissism 99.5377 2.84 0.31443 0.06
Gender -91.984 -1.31 -52.263 -0.61
Smartphone 190.068 1.56 -44.966 -0.31
Adj R^2 0.0442 -0.0144
This table reports regression models of participants Facebook friends and Twitter followers. The expected number of friends and 
followers implied by the regression models are used in the simulation analysis depicted in Table 6.
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TABLE 6
Simulation Results
Panel A: Relative frequency of successful funding out of 500,000 samples
Number of Campaign Webpage Views
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
No Reward 0.06 0.31 0.67 0.89 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
$5K Reward Threshold 0.001 0.03 0.18 0.48 0.78 0.93 0.99 1.00
Quotient 44.63 10.85 3.77 1.87 1.26 1.07 1.01 1.00
Panel B: Measures of social media activity
Number of Campaign Webpage Views
E[Facebook Posts] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No Reward 0.19 0.37 0.56 0.74 0.93 1.11 1.30 1.48
$5K Reward Threshold 0.23 0.45 0.68 0.91 1.14 1.36 1.59 1.82
Quotient 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.23 1.22 1.23 1.23 1.23
E[Tweets]
No Reward 0.15 0.30 0.46 0.61 0.76 0.91 1.07 1.22
$5K Reward Threshold 0.20 0.39 0.59 0.79 0.99 1.18 1.38 1.58
Quotient 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.30 1.29 1.30 1.30 1.30
E[Facebook Views]
No Reward 49.97 100.04 150.27 199.62 250.43 299.80 349.81 400.12
$5K Reward Threshold 61.90 123.75 185.17 247.23 308.94 370.65 432.58 494.63
Quotient 1.24 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.24
E[Twittter Views]
No Reward 24.60 49.09 73.81 98.09 122.91 147.19 171.88 196.55
$5K Reward Threshold 32.36 64.74 96.92 129.41 161.66 193.91 226.46 258.93
Quotient 1.32 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32
This table presents the results of 500,000 simulated crowdfunding campaigns. 
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TABLE 7
Descriptive Statistics for additional measured variables (Experiment 1)
Panel A: Means [standard deviation] by condition
Low Narcissism High Narcissism
$3K Reward Threshold $6K Reward Threshold $3K Reward Threshold $6K Reward Threshold
Credibility of Video 8.60 [1.14] 8.13 [1.36] 7.50 [1.93] 8.60 [1.34]
Credibility of Idea 8.60 [1.52] 8.38 [1.41] 6.50 [2.73] 9.00 [1.22]
Credibility of Market 9.00 [1.22] 8.38 [1.41] 6.63 [2.62] 9.00 [1.22]
Credibility of Company Background 8.00 [2.35] 8.00 [1.85] 7.25 [2.19] 8.60 [1.14]
Credibility of Exit Strategy 7.20 [2.17] 7.63 [2.00] 6.63 [2.50] 8.20 [1.64]
Credibility of Financial Statements 7.00 [2.24] 6.63 [2.45] 5.63 [2.83] 7.20 [2.59]
Overal Credibility of Disclosures 8.00 [2.00] 7.75 [1.75] 6.38 [2.67] 9.00 [1.22]
Investment Attractiveness 6.76 [1.74] 6.31 [2.92] 5.08 [3.74] 7.56 [2.26]
Riskiness of Investment 6.60 [2.66] 7.89 [1.42] 7.15 [2.34] 6.58 [1.80]
Probability Firm Exits as Planned 27.20 [16.51] 32.25 [30.63] 28.50 [28.85] 48.80 [30.91]
Return Given Successful Exit 6,944.20% [5,320.26%] 6,983.13% [5,752.08%] 6,526.13% [5,372.20%] 5,076.00% [3,769.32%]
Uncertainty of Return 5.40 [2.19] 5.13 [2.59] 2.13 [2.03] 6.00 [1.22]
Study's Interestingness 7.91 [1.95] 7.62 [2.57] 5.24 [3.01] 7.42 [2.10]
Has Smartphone (binary) 0.60 [0.55] 0.63 [0.52] 1.00 [0.00] 0.80 [0.45]
Increased Invest. for Reward -1.40 [2.61] -3.00 [2.51] -0.75 [3.58] -0.60 [4.28]
Increased Invest. for Reward (binary) 0.20 [0.45] 0.00 [0.00] 0.13 [0.35] 0.20 [0.45]
Invested in Past (binary) 0.20 [0.45] 0.50 [0.53] 0.38 [0.52] 0.60 [0.55]
Current Investment (thousands) $294.20 [$646.17] $27.50 [$43.18] $1.71 [$2.27] $3.20 [$3.11]
Plan to Invest in Future (binary) 0.60 [0.55] 0.63 [0.52] 0.88 [0.35] 0.80 [0.45]
Interested in Crowdfunding (binary) 0.40 [0.55] 0.38 [0.52] 0.50 [0.53] 0.40 [0.55]
Gender 0.00 [0.00] 0.75 [0.46] 0.50 [0.53] 0.40 [0.55]
Narcissism 7.00 [1.58] 9.13 [2.47] 22.13 [7.47] 21.40 [8.76]
Risk Aversion 13.80 [2.17] 13.13 [3.00] 13.50 [3.51] 13.60 [3.29]
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TABLE 8
Descriptive Statistics for additional measured variables (Experiment 2)
Panel A: Means [standard deviation] by condition
Low Narcissism High Narcissism
No Reward $5K Reward Threshold No Reward $5K Reward Threshold
Credibility of Video 7.60 [1.88] 7.71 [1.64] 6.92 [2.33] 7.98 [1.90]
Credibility of Idea 7.93 [1.53] 7.90 [1.69] 7.19 [2.36] 7.82 [2.14]
Credibility of Market 7.83 [1.69] 8.10 [1.56] 6.87 [2.44] 7.89 [1.94]
Credibility of Company Background 7.83 [2.14] 8.31 [1.65] 7.38 [2.36] 8.55 [1.59]
Credibility of Exit Strategy 6.90 [2.25] 7.07 [2.18] 6.75 [2.22] 7.52 [2.16]
Credibility of Financial Statements 7.58 [2.24] 6.50 [2.64] 6.92 [2.49] 7.43 [2.24]
Overal Credibility of Disclosures 7.38 [1.88] 7.57 [1.73] 6.83 [2.38] 7.93 [1.93]
Investment Attractiveness 5.60 [2.80] 5.75 [3.01] 5.97 [2.50] 6.63 [2.73]
Likelihood of Delaying Decision 3.40 [2.25] 4.14 [2.51] 3.74 [2.06] 3.84 [2.42]
Perceived Riskiness of Investment 7.41 [2.17] 7.04 [2.85] 6.36 [2.27] 6.67 [2.48]
Probability Firm Exits as Planned 33.60 [27.53] 29.57 [32.72] 33.83 [27.09] 39.09 [32.15]
Return Given Successful Exit 6,581.50% [5,080.66%] 6,576.45% [5,113.40%] 7,318.98% [5,147.38%] 8,689.30% [5,526.77%]
Uncertainty of Return 5.30 [2.68] 5.69 [2.82] 5.27 [2.34] 4.36 [2.51]
User of Facebook (binary) 0.80 [0.41] 0.88 [0.33] 0.90 [0.30] 0.84 [0.37]
User of Twitter (binary) 0.43 [0.50] 0.57 [0.50] 0.60 [0.50] 0.52 [0.51]
Facebook Friends 174.73 [182.68] 145.67 [138.30] 417.77 [776.34] 250.02 [259.15]
Twitter Followers 187.23 [701.07] 135.52 [444.22] 251.48 [658.42] 81.23 [162.81]
Study's Interestingness 5.81 [3.02] 6.68 [2.92] 5.80 [3.05] 6.81 [2.87]
Has Smartphone (binary) 0.90 [1.88] 0.90 [1.64] 0.92 [2.33] 0.93 [1.90]
Invested in Past (binary) 0.38 [0.49] 0.40 [0.50] 0.35 [0.48] 0.41 [0.50]
Current Investment (thousands) $42.64 [$137.91] $8.82 [$19.36] $19.15 [$41.20] $37.19 [$122.25]
Plan to Invest in Future (binary) 0.55 [0.50] 0.60 [0.50] 0.69 [0.47] 0.68 [0.47]
Interested in Crowdfunding (binary) 0.40 [0.50] 0.33 [0.48] 0.52 [0.50] 0.39 [0.49]
Gender 0.38 [0.49] 0.38 [0.49] 0.65 [0.48] 0.59 [0.50]
Narcissism 5.43 [3.01] 5.21 [2.76] 18.67 [6.48] 19.09 [7.14]
Risk Aversion 13.58 [1.88] 13.67 [1.64] 14.51 [2.33] 13.30 [1.90]
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TABLE 9
Descriptive Statistics for additional measured variables (Experiment 3)
Panel A: Means [standard deviation] by condition
Low Narcissism High Narcissism
Pre-Reward Post-Reward Pre-Reward Post-Reward
Credibility of Video 7.70 [1.83] 7.76 [1.76]
Credibility of Idea 8.11 [1.74] 7.76 [1.87]
Credibility of Market 8.00 [1.90] 7.53 [1.93]
Credibility of Company Background 8.62 [1.74] 7.84 [1.94]
Credibility of Exit Strategy 7.41 [2.12] 7.11 [2.09]
Credibility of Financial Statements 6.51 [2.16] 6.50 [2.15]
Overal Credibility of Disclosures 7.32 [2.20] 7.21 [2.26]
Investment Attractiveness 6.31 [2.45] 4.47 [2.98] 6.76 [2.04] 5.26 [2.69]
Investment Amounts $3,045.95 [$2,670.87] $3,075.68 [$2,666.40] $3,259.21 [$2,813.67] $3,452.63 [$2,968.46]
Perceived Riskiness of Investment 6.24 [2.13] 6.04 [2.49] 6.26 [1.87] 5.76 [2.01]
Probability Firm Exits as Planned 35.62 [29.83] 51.74 [26.77]
Return Given Successful Exit 7,805.14 [4,727.05] 7,680.53 [4,668.90]
Uncertainty of Return 5.81 [2.45] 5.13 [2.13]
Likelihood of Social Media Share 2.05 [2.26] 2.23 [2.20] 3.20 [2.26] 3.36 [2.34]
Study's Interestingness 5.58 [3.25] 6.80 [2.39]
Has Smartphone (binary) 0.95 [0.23] 0.97 [0.16]
Increased Invest. for Reward -2.43 [2.67] 0.08 [3.11]
Increased Invest. for Reward (binary) 0.38 [0.49] 0.55 [0.50]
Invested in Past (binary) 0.46 [0.51] 0.45 [0.50]
Current Investment (thousands) $26.79 [$89.77] $12.52 [$37.70]
Plan to Invest in Future (binary) 0.65 [0.48] 0.71 [0.46]
Interested in Crowdfunding (binary) 0.38 [0.49] 0.37 [0.49]
Gender 0.49 [0.51] 0.63 [0.49]
Narcissism 4.70 [2.60] 19.76 [5.63]
Risk Aversion 14.26 [3.85] 14.50 [7.20]
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APPENDIX   A: 
MATERIALS FROM EXPERIMENT ONE 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS      
Thank you for participating in this study.  The purpose of the study is to examine how 
individuals make investment judgments and decisions. Your participation today will take 
approximately 30 minutes. You will receive payment for completing this study.     The 
information included in the case is not intended to be completely representative of what would 
normally be available when you evaluate a company.  Providing you with that level of detail 
would require more time to complete the case than could realistically be expected.  Please make 
the best judgments you can based on the information provided in these materials. 
 
INHERITANCE 
Imagine you have a cash balance of $10,000 in your savings account that you would like to 
invest.  We will present you with a hypothetical investment opportunity that you can use any of 
your $10,000 to invest in.  The law currently does not require you to pay taxes on your $10,000 
inheritance.For purposes of this case study, which of the following are true statements?  Please 
check ALL that apply: 
 I have $10,000 worth of savings that I may invest.  
 I can choose to invest any amount of the $10,000 in an investment opportunity. 
 My inheritance is not subject to tax under current tax laws. 
 
The JOBS Act of 2013 allows for a new type of investing called crowdfunding.   
 
A company that wishes to raise money via crowdfunding must create a webpage with a 
crowdfunding portal. The webpage must include a basic description of the business (i.e. business 
plan), historical financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, and a variety of 
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additional disclosures.  The startup can ask for any amount of money up to $1,000,000, but they 
must raise the entire asking amount in order to receive any money. 
 
The typical crowdfunding investment is a company that is in a very early stage of development, 
and often has yet to earn any revenue.  Being pre-revenue does not mean that a company is 
unsuccessful, but the probability of success is very low for startups. 
 
1)  Companies looking to raise money via crowdfunding are usually startup companies that may 
have yet to earn revenue. 
 True 
 False 
 
2)  If a startup fails to raise all the capital it asks for, then it receives: 
 All the capital it seeks to raise. 
 Some of the capita it seeks to raise. 
 None of the capital it seeks to raise. 
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Startups are companies that are in an early stage of development.  
 
For a startup to develop into a business, it must raise capital from investors to fund its product 
development, inventory, and/or operations.  Often times startups are created by students or young 
entrepreneurs who do not have the capital necessary to start a business.  
 
Since startups are in an early stage of development, they make for a risky investment. Investing 
early before a company grows very large can offer a substantial return; however, more often than 
not a startup fails to be profitable and simply goes out of business. 
 
A startup needs money to start becoming a full-fledged business.  Since startups are focused on 
growing their business, it is very rare that they pay dividends to their investors - they need all the 
cash they can get!  So investors should not expect to make a return from dividends.  Rather, 
investors that invest in a startup hope to earn a return through an exit by the startup.  
 
An exit, also known as a liquidation, occurs when the startup sells its ownership to new 
owners.  There are several ways this can occur, but the two most profitable scenarios involve 
either 1) an IPO or 2) a merger or acquisition.  When an IPO occurs, the startup becomes a 
publicly owned and traded company.  Early investors are therefore able to sell their ownership on 
a public stock exchange (e.g. NYSE), and often for a substantial return.  When a merger or 
acquisition occurs, a different company sees value in the startup's business plan, product design, 
and/or customer base.  The acquiring company, in turn, offers the owners of the startup cash or 
shares (in the acquiring company) in return for the owners' shares (in the startup).  An acquisition 
or merge can also offer a substantial return to investors.      
 
Given the importance of a startups' exit, it is very common for a startup to disclose its "exit 
strategy".  That is, when seeking money from investors, startups often discuss how they plan to 
bring investors a return.  A startup will give both a strategy and a timeline for when it expects to 
exit, and therefore when investors will experience a return on their investment.      
 
In some cases, an investor can sell his or her shares before a startup executes its exit 
strategy.  However, doing so can be quite difficult because a liquid market for a startup's shares 
is unlikely to exist.    
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3) An investor will experience a financial return from investing in a startup when a startup 
executes its exit strategy. 
 True 
 False 
 
4)  An investor can easily sell its shares in a startup at any time. 
 True 
 False 
 
You will soon be presented with a crowdfunding opportunity.  However, before you can invest, 
you must complete the training required by the crowdfunding portal (Crowdfunder USA).  This 
training is required by law, and ensures that investors understand the risk they face when 
investing in startups.  Click the arrow to begin the training. 
 
 
Become an Investor on Crowdfunder USA     
 
Before investing on Crowdfunder USA, you must complete a short training to make sure you 
understand the risk you face when investing in a startup. 
 
PAST EXITS ON CROWDFUNDER      
Startups are a risky investment. Most fail, but the small percentage that succeed can bring a 
significant return. In the past, startups on Crowdfunder USA successfully execute their exit 
strategy only 5% of the time.  Exits typically occur in 4-7 years from when their funding 
campaign closes.  When an exit strategy fails, investors' entire investment is almost always lost. 
 
LIQUIDITY OF INVESTMENT PRIOR TO EXIT 
Usually, there is no active market for the shares you purchase on Crowdfunder USA.  For this 
reason, it can be very difficult for an early investor to sell his/her shares prior to a startup making 
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an exit.  Often times no market develops for a startup's shares, and when a market does exist it 
often has few, if any, buyers. 
 
5)  Based on past data, the probability that a firm listed on Crowdfunder brings investors a 
return, that is the probability it successfully executes its exit strategy, is approximately: 
 5% 
 10% 
 50% 
 
6)  If I invest in a startup on Crowdfunder USA, and the startup fails: 
 No one will be liable to pay me back the amount I invested, and my investment will be lost 
 The entrepreneurs who founded the startup will be personally liable to pay me back the 
amount I invested 
 Crowdfunder USA will be liable to pay me back the amount I invested 
 
7)  If I invest in the equity of a startup, and I decide I want my money back: 
 I will be able to surrender my shares to the company, and it will give me my money back 
 I will be able to sell my shares on a stock exchange at any time 
 I probably will not be able to sell my shares unless the startup is bought by another company 
or has an IPO 
 
8) Startups generally: 
 Do not pay dividends to investors 
 Begin paying dividends immediately 
 Pay dividends in about one year 
 
9) If I invest in the equity of a startup, the startup succeeds, and I want to cash in on the success: 
 I will definitely be able to find someone to buy my shares in the startup at any point. 
 Unless the startup is bought by another company or has an IPO, it may be difficult to find 
someone to buy my shares 
 The startup will always be required to buy back my shares  
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Below is a screenshot of E-Sign's webpage on Crowdfunder USA.  
 
 
10) What does E-Sign do? 
 It offers advanced electronic signatures that allow a person to sign a document via computer 
 It offers customized, "signature" products such as pens and sunglasses 
 
11) How much money is E-Sign trying to raise? 
 $20,000  
 $30,000  
 $84,000  
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12) How much money has E-Sign already raised? 
 $0  
 $75,000  
 $100,000  
 
13) How many investors have already invested in E-Sign?  
 0  
 40  
 90  
 140  
 
The screen shot on the previous page indicated several disclosures made be E-Sign.  To help 
investors understand its vision, business plan, and market, E-Sign has prepared text and video 
disclosures. In the next section, you will be able to view the information that E-Sign has 
disclosed to help you make your investment decision. 
 
Please pay close attention, as this information is crucial for making your investment decision. 
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14)  E-Sign uses QR technology that provides a unique QR code that can be scanned to access 
information embedded in an electronic signature. 
 True 
 False 
 
15)  How credible do you find E-Sign's video? 
 
  
56 
 
The Idea     
 
"Signatures are a thing of the past"   
 
It is the Vision of E-Sign to improve growth and business efficiency, by changing the way 
businesses conclude transactions by removing the archaic process of hand signing, and replace 
this with a more secure advanced electronic signature.   
 
The problems E-Sign solves   
 
There are a number of problems and costs associated with hand written signatures, which E-Sign 
aims to solve.  First, it significantly lowers the cost of signatures by eliminating paper and the 
need to send documents via mail.  Storage costs for electronic signatures are also much cheaper 
than storage costs for paper signatures.  Second, it reduces fraud through its simple, secure 
'advanced electronic signature' service.  
 
What E-Sign offers   
 
E-Sign offers easy signature verification, advanced fraud protection, elimination of postal costs 
and a reduction in storage costs.      
 
What we have achieved to date.   
 
E-sign took over two years to develop, and went live late 2013. Since then, the company is 
generating interest, and is endeavouring to establish a considerable client base, from individual 
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users, SME's as well as several larger corporations such as Hugo Boss who are currently trialling 
our product. E-Sign can be accessed anywhere in the world..   
 
Through the launch of our API platform, we have now created a scalable product which can be 
implemented and easily adapted to fit any companies needs.   
 
E-Sign has recently achieved ISO27001 certification   
 
The need for additional funding   
 
Funding is needed to launch a successful marketing campaign, as well as development of 
exciting new features, such as IOS app development, and features that we wish to develop 
further after listening to customer feedback.  We aim to have E-Sign accessible to everyone on 
any platform. 
 
16) The cost of providing and storing an electronic signature through E-Sign is cheaper than that 
of a paper-and-pen signature.  
 True 
 False 
 
17) E-Sign's 'digital ID' makes its 'advanced electronic signatures' very secure because signatures 
cannot be copied and storage is encrypted. 
 True 
 False 
 
18) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about its business idea? 
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The Market   
 
Digital signatures on the rise worldwide   
 
Cutting operational costs, moving to greener methods and even regulatory compliance are all 
factors driving the move away from keeping paper records and other documents, and towards 
secure electronic equivalents.  A leading part of more “secure” electronic equivalents is the 
digital signature. The world is now adopting digital signatures as more organizations move from 
paper shuffling to more efficient online processes.  When talking about “signing” an electronic 
document, for example, a PDF, it’s important to note that a digital signature is far more than an 
electronic representation of your authorization. In fact, a digital signature is a mathematical 
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scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital document. Digital signatures can assure 
that information has not been altered, as well as verify the signer’s digital identity.   
 
The market size   
 
E-Sign has clients and users from a very diverse market, which are highlighted below: 
    
 Banks and other loan and finance institutions   
 Law firms (both small and global)   
 Chartered accountants, (again both small and global)   
 Insurance   
 Estate agents   
 Tax and revenue bodies   
 Human resource   
 Pensions and life assurance  
 Life sciences   
 Retail & fashion   
 Digital media   
 Advertising and PR    
 
Current legal structure   
 
As of 2014, all 50 states and Puerto Rico consider electronic signatures to be legally binding.   
 
In 2010, US Congress passed the ESIGN Act which made electronic signatures legally binding 
for all interstate and international commerce. Furthermore, congress shortly after passed the 
Uniform Electronic Transactions (UET) Act which was subsequently adopted in 47 states and 
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Puerto Rico.  The three states that have not adopted the UET Act neverthless consider electronic 
signatures to be legally binding.      
 
Market competitors   
 
There have been many electronic service providers that have entered the market place during the 
last 18 months. However, our research suggests that none of them offer an ‘advanced electronic 
signature’ like that of e-sign.   
 
The two main competitors of e-sign are Docusign and echosign by Adobe. Both these companies 
offer the same type of electronic signature service, where a user simply uploads a document onto 
their service, then sign by typing their name onto the document. This is then transformed into a 
computer simulated hand signature. Other methods include where a user scribes their signature 
onto the uploaded document by using a mouse.   
 
We feel the problems with these methods are as follows: 
 Holds less validity than a hand signature   
 No way to verify the signatory   
 No audit trial   
 Easily forged   
 Not an advanced electronic signature   
 Replication of a hand signature and not a true electronic signature    
 
Despite this, one of e-signs closest competitors (docusign) boasted an increase of nearly 40 
million users over the last 18 months.   
 
E-Sign addresses issues in the marketplace for where signatures matter. And offers a full audit 
trial from start to finish, giving the document author notifications each step of the way. 
 
19) Electronic signatures are considered legally binding in all 50 states. 
 True  
 False 
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20) E-sign's electronic signature is superior to its competitors because (check all that apply):  
 E-Sign's 'advanced electronic signature' is not easily forged and also easy to verify.  
 E-Sign's signature provides an audit trail.  
 E-Sign's signature is not simply an "electronically simulated hand signature" like its 
competitors.  
 
21) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about the market? 
 
The People    
 
Winston Stone - Company founder and CEO   
 
Studied computer science (MIT), and business (MBA at Wharton). Experience in product 
developement (Google).      
 
Seth Knight - Operations director   
 
Experience in operations in pharmaceutical industry, as well as forensic testing and life 
sciences      
 
Tina White – Lead software developer  Studied computer science (MIT).   
 
Director & Front-end Web Developer at Google. Specialties: HTML, CSS, Javascript, jQuery, 
ExpressionEngine, Usability & User Experience Design. 
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22) E-Sign's founder and CEO, Winston Stone, has the following qualifications: 
 Computer Science degree from Massachusetts Instituted of Technology (MIT) 
 Business degree from University of Nebraska. 
 Masters in Business Administration(MBA) from Wharton(University of Pennsylvania's 
business school). 
 Worked in product development at Google. 
 
23)  E-sign's lead software developer has the following qualifications: 
 Computer Science degree from Massachusetts Instituted of Technology (MIT) 
 Worked at Google as Director and Front-end Web Developer. 
 Knows how to program using HTML, CSS, Javascript. 
 
24) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about its executives and their backgrounds? 
 
The Exit    
 
E-Sign seeks to deliver a ready market for its shares by the end of 2019 (approximately 5 
years). We envisage achieving this through a trade sale to a quoted company (adobe etc), or 
through flotation (IPO).    
 
If we achieve our forecasted results, we estimate E-Sign to have a market valuation of 
approximately $13.6m ($13,600K), based on Growing API sales, and larger companies acting as 
re-sellers.    
 
This estimation is in line with what financial analysts have estimated companies operating within 
the remit of electronic signature service provider, hold as a value at this particular timeframe 
when considering market exit strategies.   
 
Given E-Sign's high potential for growth, we believe that this is a conservative 
valuation.  However, it is important to mention that startups seeking funding on Crowfunder 
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USA often fail.  Based on past data, companies only manage to successfully execute their 
business strategy and exit strategy 5% of the time. 
 
25) Recall, E-Sign is offering 10.00% of its company for $84K. It projects a market valuation 
upon exit of $13,600K.  This means that, if E-Sign successfully executes its business plan and 
exit strategy, investors can expect a return of: 
 1,519% = 100%*($13,600K*10% - $84K)/($84K) 
 0.62% = 100%*$84K / $13600K 
 
26) Based on past data, a good estimate of the probability that E-Sign will be able to successfully 
execute its business strategy and exit strategy is approximately: 
 5%  
 30% 
 50% 
 
27) If you invest in E-Sign and it successfully executes its business plan and exit strategy, you 
will experience a return in approximately _____ years.. 
 3  
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 
28) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about its exit strategy? 
Rewards 
 Invest $100 and get     
o Shares in E-Sign and E-Sign "Early Investor" T-Shirt       
 Invest $[Reward Thershold] and get     
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o Shares in E-Sign and name and photo on E-Sign's 'founders hall of fame' section 
of the website 
 
29) If I invest $[Reward Thershold] or more in E-Sign, I receive: 
 Equity in E-Sign 
 Equity in E-Sign, a T-shirt, and my name and photo on E-Sign's 'founders' hall of fame' 
section of its website 
 A subscription to E-Sign's service 
 
65 
 
 
 
 
30) Who made the most recent investment in E-Sign? 
 Celia Bailey 
 Neil Douglas 
 Tomas Grant 
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31) How much money did Mario Aguilar invest in E-Sign? 
 $1,000 
 $500 
 $50 
 
You can find historical financial statements and a 3 year financial forecast below. 
 
 
32) As of January 2014, E-Sign has yet to earn revenue. 
 True 
 False 
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33)  Based on E-Sign's current customer base and best financial projections, its forecast indicates 
its first profits will be earned in: 
 February 2014 
 March 2014 
 April 2014  
 May 2014 
 June 2015 
 
34) How credible do you find E-Sign's forecasted financial statements? 
 
 
 
If at any time you would like to review E-Sign's disclosures, click the back arrow at the 
bottom of the page! 
 
35)  Overall, how credible do you find E-Sign's disclosures? 
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36)  How attractive do you find E-Sign as an investment?  
 
37)  How much of your $10,000 inheritance would you invest in E-Sign? 
*Note: E-Sign is only offering $9,000 in equity so you are unable to invest your entire 
inheritance. 
______________ 
38) As an investment, how risky do you believe E-Sign to be? 
 
 
39)  What do you think the probability is of E-Sign successfully executing its exit strategy?  
 
40)  If E-Sign successfully executes its business strategy, what percentage return do you expect it 
to deliver to investors that invested in its Crowdfunder USA investment round? 
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41)  If E-Sign successfully executes its business strategy, it is uncertain how large a return they 
will deliver.  Assume E-Sign exits.  How uncertain is the return they deliver? 
 
 
42)  Overall, how interesting did you find this study?  
Extremely Boring 0…1…2…3…4…5…6…7…8…9…10 Extremely Interesting. 
 
43)  Do you own a smartphone? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
44) To what extent do you agree with the following:  E-Sign's rewards played a crucial part in 
my decision to invest. 
 
45)  Did you increase your investment just so that you could get one of the rewards offered by E-
Sign? 
 Yes 
 No 
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46) An image of a QR Code appears below.  Are you familiar with QR Codes? 
 Yes - I've seen a QR code before, but I do not know what they are for. 
 Yes - I've seen a QR code before, but I have never used one. 
 Yes - I've used a QR code before. 
 No 
 
47) Have you invested in a company, public or private, in the past? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
48)  How much money do you currently have invested in equity, public or private?  
 
49)  Do you plan to invest in public or private companies in the future? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
50) Would you be interested in investing in startups via a crowdfunding platform? 
 Yes  
 No 
 
51) Let us know what you think about investing in startups via a crowdfunding platform: 
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
52) Approximately how many of the following courses have you taken at the University level (If 
you are currently a student please include both courses completed and courses in progress.)?   
Introductory accounting _____ 
Financial accounting _____ 
Managerial accounting _____ 
Auditing/assurance _____ 
Finance _____ 
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53) What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
72 
 
This inventory consists of a number of pairs of statements with which you may or may not 
identify.      
 
Consider this example: 
 
Which of these two statements is closer to your own feelings about yourself?  If you identify 
more with "liking to have authority over people" than with "not minding following orders", then 
you would choose option on the left hand side. 
  
You may identify with both statements.  In this case you should choose the statement that seems 
closer to yourself.  Or, if you do not identify with either statement, select the one that is least 
objectionable or remote.  In other words, read each pair of statements and then choose the one 
that is closer to your own feelings.  Indicate your answer by selecting either the left or right 
bubble.  Please do not skip any items. 
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74 
 
 
 
 
Below, you will make 10 hypothetical decision. Each decision is a paired choice between 
"Option A" and "Option B". Each option corresponds with a lottery. The outcome of the lottery 
is determined by the roll of a 10-sided die (all sides have the same probability of facing upwards 
after the die is rolled). The faces are numbered from 1 to 10, and whatever number that is facing 
upwards will determine your (hypothetical) payoff. 
 
For example, look at the first decision.  Option A will award you $2 if the die lands on 1, and 
$1.60 if the die lands on 2-10.  That means there is a 1/10 chance you will receive $2 and a 9/10 
chance you will receive $1.60.  Option B is different; it pays $3.85 if the die lands on 1, and 
$0.10 otherwise. Your choice is to pick between these two options. 
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APPENDIX B: 
MATERIALS FROM EXPERIMENT TWO 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS      
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  The purpose of the study is to examine how 
individuals make investment judgments and decisions. Your participation today will take 
approximately 30 minutes. You will receive payment for completing this study.      
 
The information included in the case is not intended to be completely representative of what 
would normally be available when you evaluate a company.  Providing you with that level of 
detail would require more time to complete the case than could realistically be expected.  Please 
make the best judgments you can based on the information provided in these materials. 
 
INHERITANCE 
 
Imagine you have a cash balance of $10,000 in your savings account that you would like to 
invest.  We will present you with a hypothetical investment opportunity that you can use any of 
your $10,000 to invest in.  The law currently does not require you to pay taxes on your $10,000 
inheritance. 
 
1) For purposes of this case study, which of the following are true statements?  Please check 
ALL that apply: 
 I have $10,000 worth of savings that I may invest. 
 I can choose to invest any amount of the $10,000 in an investment opportunity. 
 My inheritance is not subject to tax under current tax laws. 
 
The JOBS Act of 2013 allows for a new type of investing called crowdfunding.   
 
A company that wishes to raise money via crowdfunding must create a webpage with a 
crowdfunding portal. The webpage must include a basic description of the business (i.e. business 
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plan), historical financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, and a variety of 
additional disclosures.  The startup can ask for any amount of money up to $1,000,000, but they 
must raise the entire asking amount in order to receive any money. 
 
The typical crowdfunding investment is a company that is in a very early stage of development, 
and often has yet to earn any revenue.  Being pre-revenue does not mean that a company is 
unsuccessful, but the probability of success is very low for startups. 
 
2)  Companies looking to raise money via crowdfunding are usually startup companies that may 
have yet to earn revenue. 
 True 
 False 
 
3)  If a startup fails to raise all the capital it asks for, then it receives: 
 All the capital it seeks to raise. 
 Some of the capita it seeks to raise. 
 None of the capital it seeks to raise. 
 
Startups are companies that are in an early stage of development.       
 
For a startup to develop into a business, it must raise capital from investors to fund its product 
development, inventory, and/or operations.  Often times startups are created by students or young 
entrepreneurs who do not have the capital necessary to start a business.        
 
Since startups are in an early stage of development, they make for a risky investment.  Investing 
early before a company grows very large can offer a substantial return; however, more often than 
not a startup fails to be profitable and simply goes out of business.       
 
A startup needs money to start becoming a full-fledged business.  Since startups are focused on 
growing their business, it is very rare that they pay dividends to their investors - they need all the 
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cash they can get!  So investors should not expect to make a return from dividends.  Rather, 
investors that invest in a startup hope to earn a return through an exit by the startup.  
 
An exit, also known as a liquidation, occurs when the startup sells its ownership to new 
owners.  There are several ways this can occur, but the two most profitable scenarios involve 
either 1) an IPO or 2) a merger or acquisition.  When an IPO occurs, the startup becomes a 
publicly owned and traded company.  Early investors are therefore able to sell their ownership on 
a public stock exchange (e.g. NYSE), and often for a substantial return.  When a merger or 
acquisition occurs, a different company sees value in the startup's business plan, product design, 
and/or customer base.  The acquiring company, in turn, offers the owners of the startup cash or 
shares (in the acquiring company) in return for the owners' shares (in the startup).  An acquisition 
or merge can also offer a substantial return to investors.      
 
Given the importance of a startups' exit, it is very common for a startup to disclose its "exit 
strategy".  That is, when seeking money from investors, startups often discuss how they plan to 
bring investors a return.  A startup will give both a strategy and a timeline for when it expects to 
exit, and therefore when investors will experience a return on their investment.      
 
In some cases, an investor can sell his or her shares before a startup executes its exit 
strategy.  However, doing so can be quite difficult because a liquid market for a startup's shares 
is unlikely to exist.    
 
4)  An investor will experience a financial return from investing in a startup when a startup 
executes its exit strategy. 
 True 
 False 
 
5)  An investor can easily sell its shares in a startup at any time. 
 True 
 False 
 
You will soon be presented with a crowdfunding opportunity.  However, before you can invest, 
you must complete the training required by the crowdfunding portal (Crowdfunder USA).  This 
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training is required by law, and ensures that investors understand the risk they face when 
investing in startups.  Click the arrow to begin the training. 
 
Become an Investor on Crowdfunder USA     
 
Before investing on Crowdfunder USA, you must complete a short training to make sure you 
understand the risk you face when investing in a startup. 
 
PAST EXITS ON CROWDFUNDER      
 
Startups are a risky investment. Most fail, but the small percentage that succeed can bring a 
significant return. In the past, startups on Crowdfunder USA successfully execute their exit 
strategy only 5% of the time.  Exits typically occur in 4-7 years from when their funding 
campaign closes.  When an exit strategy fails, investors' entire investment is almost always lost. 
 
LIQUIDITY OF INVESTMENT PRIOR TO EXIT 
 
Usually, there is no active market for the shares you purchase on Crowdfunder USA.  For this 
reason, it can be very difficult for an early investor to sell his/her shares prior to a startup making 
an exit.  Often times no market develops for a startup's shares, and when a market does exist it 
often has few, if any, buyers. 
 
6)  Based on past data, the probability that a firm listed on Crowdfunder brings investors a 
return, that is the probability it successfully executes its exit strategy, is approximately: 
 5% 
 10% 
 50% 
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7)  If I invest in a startup on Crowdfunder USA, and the startup fails: 
 No one will be liable to pay me back the amount I invested, and my investment will be lost 
 The entrepreneurs who founded the startup will be personally liable to pay me back the 
amount I invested 
 Crowdfunder USA will be liable to pay me back the amount I invested 
 
8)  If I invest in the equity of a startup, and I decide I want my money back: 
 I will be able to surrender my shares to the company, and it will give me my money back 
 I will be able to sell my shares on a stock exchange at any time 
 I probably will not be able to sell my shares unless the startup is bought by another company 
or has an IPO 
 
9)  Startups generally: 
 Do not pay dividends to investors 
 Begin paying dividends immediately 
 Pay dividends in about one year 
 
10)  If I invest in the equity of a startup, the startup succeeds, and I want to cash in on the 
success: 
 I will definitely be able to find someone to buy my shares in the startup at any point. 
 Unless the startup is bought by another company or has an IPO, it may be difficult to find 
someone to buy my shares 
 The startup will always be required to buy back my shares 
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Below is a screenshot of E-Sign's webpage on Crowdfunder USA.  
 
 
11)  What does E-Sign do? 
 It offers advanced electronic signatures that allow a person to sign a document via computer 
 It offers customized, "signature" products such as pens and sunglasses 
 
12)  How much money is E-Sign trying to raise? 
 $20,000 
 $30,000 
 $84,000 
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13)  How much money has E-Sign already raised? 
 $0 
 $75,000 
 $100,000 
 
14)  How many investors have already invested in E-Sign?  
 0 
 40 
 90 
 140 
 
The screen shot on the previous page indicated several disclosures made be E-Sign.  To help 
investors understand its vision, business plan, and market, E-Sign has prepared text and video 
disclosures. In the next section, you will be able to view the information that E-Sign has 
disclosed to help you make your investment decision. 
 
Please pay close attention, as this information is crucial for making your investment decision. 
 
Please watch this video to learn about E-Sign: 
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15)  E-Sign uses QR technology that provides a unique QR code that can be scanned to access 
information embedded in an electronic signature. 
 True 
 False 
 
16)  How credible do you find E-Sign's video? 
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The Idea     
 
"Signatures are a thing of the past"   
 
It is the Vision of E-Sign to improve growth and business efficiency, by changing the way 
businesses conclude transactions by removing the archaic process of hand signing, and replace 
this with a more secure advanced electronic signature.   
 
The problems E-Sign solves   
 
There are a number of problems and costs associated with hand written signatures, which E-Sign 
aims to solve.  First, it significantly lowers the cost of signatures by eliminating paper and the 
need to send documents via mail.  Storage costs for electronic signatures are also much cheaper 
than storage costs for paper signatures.  Second, it reduces fraud through its simple, secure 
'advanced electronic signature' service.  
 
What E-Sign offers   
 
E-Sign offers easy signature verification, advanced fraud protection, elimination of postal costs 
and a reduction in storage costs.      
 
What we have achieved to date.   
 
E-sign took over two years to develop, and went live late 2013. Since then, the company is 
generating interest, and is endeavouring to establish a considerable client base, from individual 
84 
 
users, SME's as well as several larger corporations such as Hugo Boss who are currently trialling 
our product. E-Sign can be accessed anywhere in the world..   
 
Through the launch of our API platform, we have now created a scalable product which can be 
implemented and easily adapted to fit any companies needs.   
 
E-Sign has recently achieved ISO27001 certification   
 
The need for additional funding   
 
Funding is needed to launch a successful marketing campaign, as well as development of 
exciting new features, such as IOS app development, and features that we wish to develop 
further after listening to customer feedback.  We aim to have E-Sign accessible to everyone on 
any platform. 
 
17) The cost of providing and storing an electronic signature through E-Sign is cheaper than that 
of a paper-and-pen signature.  
 True 
 False 
 
18) E-Sign's 'digital ID' makes its 'advanced electronic signatures' very secure because signatures 
cannot be copied and storage is encrypted. 
 True 
 False 
 
19) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about its business idea? 
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The Market   
 
Digital signatures on the rise worldwide   
 
Cutting operational costs, moving to greener methods and even regulatory compliance are all 
factors driving the move away from keeping paper records and other documents, and towards 
secure electronic equivalents.  A leading part of more “secure” electronic equivalents is the 
digital signature. The world is now adopting digital signatures as more organizations move from 
paper shuffling to more efficient online processes.  When talking about “signing” an electronic 
document, for example, a PDF, it’s important to note that a digital signature is far more than an 
electronic representation of your authorization. In fact, a digital signature is a mathematical 
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scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital document. Digital signatures can assure 
that information has not been altered, as well as verify the signer’s digital identity.   
 
The market size   
 
E-Sign has clients and users from a very diverse market, which are highlighted below: 
    
 Banks and other loan and finance institutions   
 Law firms (both small and global)   
 Chartered accountants, (again both small and global)   
 Insurance   
 Estate agents   
 Tax and revenue bodies   
 Human resource   
 Pensions and life assurance  
 Life sciences   
 Retail & fashion   
 Digital media   
 Advertising and PR    
 
Current legal structure   
 
As of 2014, all 50 states and Puerto Rico consider electronic signatures to be legally binding.   
 
In 2010, US Congress passed the ESIGN Act which made electronic signatures legally binding 
for all interstate and international commerce. Furthermore, congress shortly after passed the 
Uniform Electronic Transactions (UET) Act which was subsequently adopted in 47 states and 
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Puerto Rico.  The three states that have not adopted the UET Act neverthless consider electronic 
signatures to be legally binding.      
 
Market competitors   
 
There have been many electronic service providers that have entered the market place during the 
last 18 months. However, our research suggests that none of them offer an ‘advanced electronic 
signature’ like that of e-sign.   
 
The two main competitors of e-sign are Docusign and echosign by Adobe. Both these companies 
offer the same type of electronic signature service, where a user simply uploads a document onto 
their service, then sign by typing their name onto the document. This is then transformed into a 
computer simulated hand signature. Other methods include where a user scribes their signature 
onto the uploaded document by using a mouse.   
 
We feel the problems with these methods are as follows: 
 Holds less validity than a hand signature   
 No way to verify the signatory   
 No audit trial   
 Easily forged   
 Not an advanced electronic signature   
 Replication of a hand signature and not a true electronic signature    
 
Despite this, one of e-signs closest competitors (docusign) boasted an increase of nearly 40 
million users over the last 18 months.   
 
E-Sign addresses issues in the marketplace for where signatures matter. And offers a full audit 
trial from start to finish, giving the document author notifications each step of the way. 
 
20) Electronic signatures are considered legally binding in all 50 states. 
 True  
 False 
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21) E-sign's electronic signature is superior to its competitors because (check all that apply):  
 E-Sign's 'advanced electronic signature' is not easily forged and also easy to verify.  
 E-Sign's signature provides an audit trail.  
 E-Sign's signature is not simply an "electronically simulated hand signature" like its 
competitors.  
 
22) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about the market? 
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The People    
 
Winston Stone - Company founder and CEO   
 
Studied computer science (MIT), and business (MBA at Wharton). Experience in product 
developement (Google).      
 
Seth Knight - Operations director   
 
Experience in operations in pharmaceutical industry, as well as forensic testing and life 
sciences      
 
Tina White – Lead software developer  Studied computer science (MIT).   
 
Director & Front-end Web Developer at Google. Specialties: HTML, CSS, Javascript, jQuery, 
ExpressionEngine, Usability & User Experience Design. 
 
23) E-Sign's founder and CEO, Winston Stone, has the following qualifications: 
 Computer Science degree from Massachusetts Instituted of Technology (MIT) 
 Business degree from University of Nebraska. 
 Masters in Business Administration(MBA) from Wharton(University of Pennsylvania's 
business school). 
 Worked in product development at Google. 
 
24)  E-sign's lead software developer has the following qualifications: 
 Computer Science degree from Massachusetts Instituted of Technology (MIT) 
 Worked at Google as Director and Front-end Web Developer. 
 Knows how to program using HTML, CSS, Javascript. 
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25) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about its executives and their backgrounds? 
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The Exit    
 
E-Sign seeks to deliver a ready market for its shares by the end of 2019 (approximately 5 
years). We envisage achieving this through a trade sale to a quoted company (adobe etc), or 
through flotation (IPO).    
 
If we achieve our forecasted results, we estimate E-Sign to have a market valuation of 
approximately $13.6m ($13,600K), based on Growing API sales, and larger companies acting as 
re-sellers.    
 
This estimation is in line with what financial analysts have estimated companies operating within 
the remit of electronic signature service provider, hold as a value at this particular timeframe 
when considering market exit strategies.   
 
Given E-Sign's high potential for growth, we believe that this is a conservative 
valuation.  However, it is important to mention that startups seeking funding on Crowfunder 
USA often fail.  Based on past data, companies only manage to successfully execute their 
business strategy and exit strategy 5% of the time. 
 
26) Recall, E-Sign is offering 10.00% of its company for $84K. It projects a market valuation 
upon exit of $13,600K.  This means that, if E-Sign successfully executes its business plan and 
exit strategy, investors can expect a return of: 
 1,519% = 100%*($13,600K*10% - $84K)/($84K) 
 0.62% = 100%*$84K / $13600K 
 
27) Based on past data, a good estimate of the probability that E-Sign will be able to successfully 
execute its business strategy and exit strategy is approximately: 
 5%  
 30% 
 50% 
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28) If you invest in E-Sign and it successfully executes its business plan and exit strategy, you 
will experience a return in approximately _____ years.. 
 3  
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 
29) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about its exit strategy? 
 
You can find historical financial statements and a 3 year financial forecast below. 
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30) As of January 2014, E-Sign has yet to earn revenue. 
 True 
 False 
 
31a)  Based on E-Sign's current customer base and best financial projections, its forecast 
indicates its first profits will be earned in: 
 February 2014 
 March 2014 
 April 2014  
 May 2014 
 June 2015 
 
[Rewards Present Condition only]  
 
Rewards      
 
 Invest $5,000 and get       
o Shares in E-Sign and name and photo on E-Sign's 'founders hall of fame' section 
of the website 
 
32b)   If I invest $5,000 or more in E-Sign, I receive: 
 Equity in E-Sign 
 Equity in E-Sign and my name and photo on E-Sign's 'founders' hall of fame' section of its 
website 
 A subscription to E-Sign's service 
 
[Rewards Condition] 
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[No Rewards Condition] 
 
If at any time you would like to review E-Sign's disclosures, click the back arrow at the bottom 
of the page! 
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33)  Overall, how credible do you find E-Sign's disclosures? 
 
34)  How attractive do you find E-Sign as an investment?  
 
35)  How much of your $10,000 inheritance would you invest in E-Sign? 
__________ 
 
36)  How likely are you to delay your decision about whether or not to invest in E-Sign? 
 
 
37)  As an investment, how risky do you believe E-Sign to be? 
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38)  What do you think the probability is of E-Sign successfully executing its exit strategy?  
 
39)  If E-Sign successfully executes its business strategy, what percentage return do you expect it 
to deliver to investors that invested in its Crowdfunder USA investment round? 
 
40)  If E-Sign successfully executes its business strategy, it is uncertain how large a return they 
will deliver.  Assume E-Sign exits.  How uncertain is the return they deliver? 
 
41)  Do you have a Facebook account? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
42)  Do you have a Twitter account? 
 Yes 
 No 
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43)  How likely are you to make a post on Facebook related to your investment? 
 
44)  How likely are you to post a tweet on Twitter related to your investment? 
 
45)  Approximately how many Facebook friends do you have? (Enter 0 if you are not on 
Facebook) 
____________ 
 
46)  Approximately how many Twitter followers do you have? (Enter 0 if you are not on 
Twitter) 
____________ 
 
47)  Overall, how interesting did you find this study? Extremely 
Boring 0…1…2…3…4…5…6…7…8…9…10 Extremely Interesting. 
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48) Do you own a smartphone? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
49)  Did you increase your investment just so that you could get one of the rewards offered by E-
Sign? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
50)  An image of a QR Code appears below.  Are you familiar with QR Codes? 
 Yes - I've seen a QR code before, but I do not know what they are for. 
 Yes - I've seen a QR code before, but I have never used one. 
 Yes - I've used a QR code before. 
 No 
 
51)  Have you invested in a company, public or private, in the past? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
52)  How much money do you currently have invested in equity, public or private?  
__________ 
 
53)  Do you plan to invest in public or private companies in the future? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
54) Would you be interested in investing in startups via a crowdfunding platform? 
 Yes 
 No 
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55)  Let us know what you think about investing in startups via a crowdfunding platform: 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
56)  Approximately how many of the following courses have you taken at the University level (If 
you are currently a student please include both courses completed and courses in progress.)?   
Introductory accounting _____ 
Financial accounting _____ 
Managerial accounting _____ 
Auditing/assurance _____ 
Finance _____ 
 
57)  What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
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This inventory consists of a number of pairs of statements with which you may or may not 
identify.      
 
Consider this example: 
 
Which of these two statements is closer to your own feelings about yourself?  If you identify 
more with "liking to have authority over people" than with "not minding following orders", then 
you would choose option on the left hand side. 
  
You may identify with both statements.  In this case you should choose the statement that seems 
closer to yourself.  Or, if you do not identify with either statement, select the one that is least 
objectionable or remote.  In other words, read each pair of statements and then choose the one 
that is closer to your own feelings.  Indicate your answer by selecting either the left or right 
bubble.  Please do not skip any items. 
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Below, you will make 10 hypothetical decision. Each decision is a paired choice between 
"Option A" and "Option B". Each option corresponds with a lottery. The outcome of the lottery 
is determined by the roll of a 10-sided die (all sides have the same probability of facing upwards 
after the die is rolled). The faces are numbered from 1 to 10, and whatever number that is facing 
upwards will determine your (hypothetical) payoff. 
 
For example, look at the first decision.  Option A will award you $2 if the die lands on 1, and 
$1.60 if the die lands on 2-10.  That means there is a 1/10 chance you will receive $2 and a 9/10 
chance you will receive $1.60.  Option B is different; it pays $3.85 if the die lands on 1, and 
$0.10 otherwise. Your choice is to pick between these two options. 
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APPENDIX C: 
MATERIALS FROM EXPERIMENT THREE 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS      
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  The purpose of the study is to examine how 
individuals make investment judgments and decisions. Your participation today will take 
approximately 30 minutes. You will receive payment for completing this study.      
 
The information included in the case is not intended to be completely representative of what 
would normally be available when you evaluate a company.  Providing you with that level of 
detail would require more time to complete the case than could realistically be expected.  Please 
make the best judgments you can based on the information provided in these materials. 
 
INHERITANCE 
 
Imagine you have a cash balance of $10,000 in your savings account that you would like to 
invest.  We will present you with a hypothetical investment opportunity that you can use any of 
your $10,000 to invest in.  The law currently does not require you to pay taxes on your $10,000 
inheritance. 
 
1) For purposes of this case study, which of the following are true statements?  Please check 
ALL that apply: 
 I have $10,000 worth of savings that I may invest. 
 I can choose to invest any amount of the $10,000 in an investment opportunity. 
 My inheritance is not subject to tax under current tax laws. 
 
The JOBS Act of 2013 allows for a new type of investing called crowdfunding.   
 
A company that wishes to raise money via crowdfunding must create a webpage with a 
crowdfunding portal. The webpage must include a basic description of the business (i.e. business 
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plan), historical financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, and a variety of 
additional disclosures.  The startup can ask for any amount of money up to $1,000,000, but they 
must raise the entire asking amount in order to receive any money. 
 
The typical crowdfunding investment is a company that is in a very early stage of development, 
and often has yet to earn any revenue.  Being pre-revenue does not mean that a company is 
unsuccessful, but the probability of success is very low for startups. 
 
2)  Companies looking to raise money via crowdfunding are usually startup companies that may 
have yet to earn revenue. 
 True 
 False 
 
3)  If a startup fails to raise all the capital it asks for, then it receives: 
 All the capital it seeks to raise. 
 Some of the capita it seeks to raise. 
 None of the capital it seeks to raise. 
 
Startups are companies that are in an early stage of development.       
 
For a startup to develop into a business, it must raise capital from investors to fund its product 
development, inventory, and/or operations.  Often times startups are created by students or young 
entrepreneurs who do not have the capital necessary to start a business.        
 
Since startups are in an early stage of development, they make for a risky investment.  Investing 
early before a company grows very large can offer a substantial return; however, more often than 
not a startup fails to be profitable and simply goes out of business.       
 
A startup needs money to start becoming a full-fledged business.  Since startups are focused on 
growing their business, it is very rare that they pay dividends to their investors - they need all the 
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cash they can get!  So investors should not expect to make a return from dividends.  Rather, 
investors that invest in a startup hope to earn a return through an exit by the startup.  
 
An exit, also known as a liquidation, occurs when the startup sells its ownership to new 
owners.  There are several ways this can occur, but the two most profitable scenarios involve 
either 1) an IPO or 2) a merger or acquisition.  When an IPO occurs, the startup becomes a 
publicly owned and traded company.  Early investors are therefore able to sell their ownership on 
a public stock exchange (e.g. NYSE), and often for a substantial return.  When a merger or 
acquisition occurs, a different company sees value in the startup's business plan, product design, 
and/or customer base.  The acquiring company, in turn, offers the owners of the startup cash or 
shares (in the acquiring company) in return for the owners' shares (in the startup).  An acquisition 
or merge can also offer a substantial return to investors.      
 
Given the importance of a startups' exit, it is very common for a startup to disclose its "exit 
strategy".  That is, when seeking money from investors, startups often discuss how they plan to 
bring investors a return.  A startup will give both a strategy and a timeline for when it expects to 
exit, and therefore when investors will experience a return on their investment.      
 
In some cases, an investor can sell his or her shares before a startup executes its exit 
strategy.  However, doing so can be quite difficult because a liquid market for a startup's shares 
is unlikely to exist.    
 
4)  An investor will experience a financial return from investing in a startup when a startup 
executes its exit strategy. 
 True 
 False 
 
5)  An investor can easily sell its shares in a startup at any time. 
 True 
 False 
 
You will soon be presented with a crowdfunding opportunity.  However, before you can invest, 
you must complete the training required by the crowdfunding portal (Crowdfunder USA).  This 
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training is required by law, and ensures that investors understand the risk they face when 
investing in startups.  Click the arrow to begin the training. 
 
Become an Investor on Crowdfunder USA     
 
Before investing on Crowdfunder USA, you must complete a short training to make sure you 
understand the risk you face when investing in a startup. 
 
PAST EXITS ON CROWDFUNDER      
 
Startups are a risky investment. Most fail, but the small percentage that succeed can bring a 
significant return. In the past, startups on Crowdfunder USA successfully execute their exit 
strategy only 5% of the time.  Exits typically occur in 4-7 years from when their funding 
campaign closes.  When an exit strategy fails, investors' entire investment is almost always lost. 
 
LIQUIDITY OF INVESTMENT PRIOR TO EXIT 
 
Usually, there is no active market for the shares you purchase on Crowdfunder USA.  For this 
reason, it can be very difficult for an early investor to sell his/her shares prior to a startup making 
an exit.  Often times no market develops for a startup's shares, and when a market does exist it 
often has few, if any, buyers. 
 
6)  Based on past data, the probability that a firm listed on Crowdfunder brings investors a 
return, that is the probability it successfully executes its exit strategy, is approximately: 
 5% 
 10% 
 50% 
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7)  If I invest in a startup on Crowdfunder USA, and the startup fails: 
 No one will be liable to pay me back the amount I invested, and my investment will be lost 
 The entrepreneurs who founded the startup will be personally liable to pay me back the 
amount I invested 
 Crowdfunder USA will be liable to pay me back the amount I invested 
 
8)  If I invest in the equity of a startup, and I decide I want my money back: 
 I will be able to surrender my shares to the company, and it will give me my money back 
 I will be able to sell my shares on a stock exchange at any time 
 I probably will not be able to sell my shares unless the startup is bought by another company 
or has an IPO 
 
9)  Startups generally: 
 Do not pay dividends to investors 
 Begin paying dividends immediately 
 Pay dividends in about one year 
 
10)  If I invest in the equity of a startup, the startup succeeds, and I want to cash in on the 
success: 
 I will definitely be able to find someone to buy my shares in the startup at any point. 
 Unless the startup is bought by another company or has an IPO, it may be difficult to find 
someone to buy my shares 
 The startup will always be required to buy back my shares 
 
108 
 
Below is a screenshot of E-Sign's webpage on Crowdfunder USA.  
 
 
11)  What does E-Sign do? 
 It offers advanced electronic signatures that allow a person to sign a document via computer 
 It offers customized, "signature" products such as pens and sunglasses 
 
12)  How much money is E-Sign trying to raise? 
 $20,000 
 $30,000 
 $84,000 
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13)  How much money has E-Sign already raised? 
 $0 
 $75,000 
 $100,000 
 
14)  How many investors have already invested in E-Sign?  
 0 
 40 
 90 
 140 
 
The screen shot on the previous page indicated several disclosures made be E-Sign.  To help 
investors understand its vision, business plan, and market, E-Sign has prepared text and video 
disclosures. In the next section, you will be able to view the information that E-Sign has 
disclosed to help you make your investment decision. 
 
Please pay close attention, as this information is crucial for making your investment decision. 
 
Please watch this video to learn about E-Sign: 
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15)  E-Sign uses QR technology that provides a unique QR code that can be scanned to access 
information embedded in an electronic signature. 
 True 
 False 
 
16)  How credible do you find E-Sign's video? 
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The Idea     
 
"Signatures are a thing of the past"   
 
It is the Vision of E-Sign to improve growth and business efficiency, by changing the way 
businesses conclude transactions by removing the archaic process of hand signing, and replace 
this with a more secure advanced electronic signature.   
 
The problems E-Sign solves   
 
There are a number of problems and costs associated with hand written signatures, which E-Sign 
aims to solve.  First, it significantly lowers the cost of signatures by eliminating paper and the 
need to send documents via mail.  Storage costs for electronic signatures are also much cheaper 
than storage costs for paper signatures.  Second, it reduces fraud through its simple, secure 
'advanced electronic signature' service.  
 
What E-Sign offers   
 
E-Sign offers easy signature verification, advanced fraud protection, elimination of postal costs 
and a reduction in storage costs.      
 
What we have achieved to date.   
 
E-sign took over two years to develop, and went live late 2013. Since then, the company is 
generating interest, and is endeavouring to establish a considerable client base, from individual 
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users, SME's as well as several larger corporations such as Hugo Boss who are currently trialling 
our product. E-Sign can be accessed anywhere in the world..   
 
Through the launch of our API platform, we have now created a scalable product which can be 
implemented and easily adapted to fit any companies needs.   
 
E-Sign has recently achieved ISO27001 certification   
 
The need for additional funding   
 
Funding is needed to launch a successful marketing campaign, as well as development of 
exciting new features, such as IOS app development, and features that we wish to develop 
further after listening to customer feedback.  We aim to have E-Sign accessible to everyone on 
any platform. 
 
17) The cost of providing and storing an electronic signature through E-Sign is cheaper than that 
of a paper-and-pen signature.  
 True 
 False 
 
18) E-Sign's 'digital ID' makes its 'advanced electronic signatures' very secure because signatures 
cannot be copied and storage is encrypted. 
 True 
 False 
 
19) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about its business idea? 
 
 
113 
 
The Market   
 
Digital signatures on the rise worldwide   
 
Cutting operational costs, moving to greener methods and even regulatory compliance are all 
factors driving the move away from keeping paper records and other documents, and towards 
secure electronic equivalents.  A leading part of more “secure” electronic equivalents is the 
digital signature. The world is now adopting digital signatures as more organizations move from 
paper shuffling to more efficient online processes.  When talking about “signing” an electronic 
document, for example, a PDF, it’s important to note that a digital signature is far more than an 
electronic representation of your authorization. In fact, a digital signature is a mathematical 
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scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital document. Digital signatures can assure 
that information has not been altered, as well as verify the signer’s digital identity.   
 
The market size   
 
E-Sign has clients and users from a very diverse market, which are highlighted below: 
    
 Banks and other loan and finance institutions   
 Law firms (both small and global)   
 Chartered accountants, (again both small and global)   
 Insurance   
 Estate agents   
 Tax and revenue bodies   
 Human resource   
 Pensions and life assurance  
 Life sciences   
 Retail & fashion   
 Digital media   
 Advertising and PR    
 
Current legal structure   
 
As of 2014, all 50 states and Puerto Rico consider electronic signatures to be legally binding.   
 
In 2010, US Congress passed the ESIGN Act which made electronic signatures legally binding 
for all interstate and international commerce. Furthermore, congress shortly after passed the 
Uniform Electronic Transactions (UET) Act which was subsequently adopted in 47 states and 
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Puerto Rico.  The three states that have not adopted the UET Act neverthless consider electronic 
signatures to be legally binding.      
 
Market competitors   
 
There have been many electronic service providers that have entered the market place during the 
last 18 months. However, our research suggests that none of them offer an ‘advanced electronic 
signature’ like that of e-sign.   
 
The two main competitors of e-sign are Docusign and echosign by Adobe. Both these companies 
offer the same type of electronic signature service, where a user simply uploads a document onto 
their service, then sign by typing their name onto the document. This is then transformed into a 
computer simulated hand signature. Other methods include where a user scribes their signature 
onto the uploaded document by using a mouse.   
 
We feel the problems with these methods are as follows: 
 Holds less validity than a hand signature   
 No way to verify the signatory   
 No audit trial   
 Easily forged   
 Not an advanced electronic signature   
 Replication of a hand signature and not a true electronic signature    
 
Despite this, one of e-signs closest competitors (docusign) boasted an increase of nearly 40 
million users over the last 18 months.   
 
E-Sign addresses issues in the marketplace for where signatures matter. And offers a full audit 
trial from start to finish, giving the document author notifications each step of the way. 
 
20) Electronic signatures are considered legally binding in all 50 states. 
 True  
 False 
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21) E-sign's electronic signature is superior to its competitors because (check all that apply):  
 E-Sign's 'advanced electronic signature' is not easily forged and also easy to verify.  
 E-Sign's signature provides an audit trail.  
 E-Sign's signature is not simply an "electronically simulated hand signature" like its 
competitors.  
 
22) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about the market? 
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The People    
 
Winston Stone - Company founder and CEO   
 
Studied computer science (MIT), and business (MBA at Wharton). Experience in product 
developement (Google).      
 
Seth Knight - Operations director   
 
Experience in operations in pharmaceutical industry, as well as forensic testing and life 
sciences      
 
Tina White – Lead software developer  Studied computer science (MIT).   
 
Director & Front-end Web Developer at Google. Specialties: HTML, CSS, Javascript, jQuery, 
ExpressionEngine, Usability & User Experience Design. 
 
23) E-Sign's founder and CEO, Winston Stone, has the following qualifications: 
 Computer Science degree from Massachusetts Instituted of Technology (MIT) 
 Business degree from University of Nebraska. 
 Masters in Business Administration(MBA) from Wharton(University of Pennsylvania's 
business school). 
 Worked in product development at Google. 
 
24)  E-sign's lead software developer has the following qualifications: 
 Computer Science degree from Massachusetts Instituted of Technology (MIT) 
 Worked at Google as Director and Front-end Web Developer. 
 Knows how to program using HTML, CSS, Javascript. 
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25) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about its executives and their backgrounds? 
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The Exit    
 
E-Sign seeks to deliver a ready market for its shares by the end of 2019 (approximately 5 
years). We envisage achieving this through a trade sale to a quoted company (adobe etc), or 
through flotation (IPO).    
 
If we achieve our forecasted results, we estimate E-Sign to have a market valuation of 
approximately $13.6m ($13,600K), based on Growing API sales, and larger companies acting as 
re-sellers.    
 
This estimation is in line with what financial analysts have estimated companies operating within 
the remit of electronic signature service provider, hold as a value at this particular timeframe 
when considering market exit strategies.   
 
Given E-Sign's high potential for growth, we believe that this is a conservative 
valuation.  However, it is important to mention that startups seeking funding on Crowfunder 
USA often fail.  Based on past data, companies only manage to successfully execute their 
business strategy and exit strategy 5% of the time. 
 
26) Recall, E-Sign is offering 10.00% of its company for $84K. It projects a market valuation 
upon exit of $13,600K.  This means that, if E-Sign successfully executes its business plan and 
exit strategy, investors can expect a return of: 
 1,519% = 100%*($13,600K*10% - $84K)/($84K) 
 0.62% = 100%*$84K / $13600K 
 
27) Based on past data, a good estimate of the probability that E-Sign will be able to successfully 
execute its business strategy and exit strategy is approximately: 
 5%  
 30% 
 50% 
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28) If you invest in E-Sign and it successfully executes its business plan and exit strategy, you 
will experience a return in approximately _____ years.. 
 3  
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 
29) How credible do you find E-Sign's disclosure about its exit strategy? 
 
You can find historical financial statements and a 3 year financial forecast below. 
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32) As of January 2014, E-Sign has yet to earn revenue. 
 True 
 False 
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If at any time you would like to review E‐Sign's disclosures, click the back arrow at the bottom of the 
page! 
 
33)  Overall, how credible do you find E-Sign's disclosures? 
 
34)  How attractive do you find E-Sign as an investment?  
 
35)  How much of your $10,000 inheritance would you invest in E-Sign? 
*Note: E-Sign is only offering $9,000 in equity so you are unable to invest your entire 
inheritance. 
__________ 
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36)  How likely are you to delay your decision about whether or not to invest in E-Sign? 
 
 
37)  As an investment, how risky do you believe E-Sign to be? 
 
 
38)  What do you think the probability is of E-Sign successfully executing its exit strategy?  
 
39)  If E-Sign successfully executes its business strategy, what percentage return do you expect it 
to deliver to investors that invested in its Crowdfunder USA investment round? 
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40)  If E-Sign successfully executes its business strategy, it is uncertain how large a return they 
will deliver.  Assume E-Sign exits.  How uncertain is the return they deliver? 
 
 
41)  How likely are you to make a post on social media (e.g. Facebook or Twitter) related to your 
investment? 
 
 
 
Although you've already made your investment decision, some new information has come to light: E‐Sign 
offers rewards for investments that exceed certain investment thresholds. Please move on to the next 
page to learn more. 
 
Rewards          
 
Invest $[Investment Amount+100] and get: 
 Shares in E‐Sign and name and photo on E‐Sign's 'founders hall of fame' section of the website 
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42)  If I invest $[Investment Amount+100] or more in E‐Sign, I receive: 
 Equity in E‐Sign 
 Equity in E‐Sign and my name and photo on E‐Sign's 'founders' hall of fame' section of its website 
 A subscription to E‐Sign's service 
 
43) Would you increase your investment in order to receive the reward mentioned above? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
44)  Now that you know that E‐Sign offers a reward for investing, how attractive do you find E‐Sign as an 
investment?  
 
45)  Now that you know that E‐Sign offers a reward for investing, how much of your $10,000 inheritance 
would you invest in E‐Sign? 
*Note: E‐Sign is only offering $9,000 in equity so you are unable to invest your entire inheritance. 
___________ 
 
46)  Now that you know that E‐Sign offers a reward for investing, how risky do you believe E‐Sign to be? 
 
47)  By how much money would you be willing to increase your investment to receive the reward that E‐
Sign is offering? 
_____________ 
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48)  Now that you know that E‐Sign offers rewards for investing, how likely are you to make a post on 
social media (e.g. Facebook or Twitter) related to your investment? 
 
49)  Overall, how interesting did you find this study? Extremely Boring 0…1…2…3…4…5…6…7…8…9…10 
Extremely Interesting. 
 
50)  Do you own a smartphone? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
60)  To what extent do you agree with the following:  E‐Sign's rewards played a crucial part in my 
decision to invest. 
 
61)  Did you increase your investment just so that you could get one of the rewards offered by E‐Sign? 
 Yes 
 No 
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62)  An image of a QR Code appears below.  Are you familiar with QR Codes? 
 Yes ‐ I've seen a QR code before, but I do not know what they are for. 
 Yes ‐ I've seen a QR code before, but I have never used one. 
 Yes ‐ I've used a QR code before. 
 No 
 
63)  Have you invested in a company, public or private, in the past? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
64)  How much money do you currently have invested in equity, public or private?  ______ 
 
65) Do you plan to invest in public or private companies in the future? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
66) Would you be interested in investing in startups via a crowdfunding platform? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
67)  Let us know what you think about investing in startups via a crowdfunding platform: 
 
68)  Approximately how many of the following courses have you taken at the University level (If you are 
currently a student please include both courses completed and courses in progress.)?   
Introductory accounting ______ 
Financial accounting ______ 
Managerial accounting ______ 
Auditing/assurance ______ 
Finance ______ 
 
69)  What is your gender? 
 Males 
 Female 
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This inventory consists of a number of pairs of statements with which you may or may not 
identify.      
 
Consider this example: 
 
Which of these two statements is closer to your own feelings about yourself?  If you identify 
more with "liking to have authority over people" than with "not minding following orders", then 
you would choose option on the left hand side. 
  
You may identify with both statements.  In this case you should choose the statement that seems 
closer to yourself.  Or, if you do not identify with either statement, select the one that is least 
objectionable or remote.  In other words, read each pair of statements and then choose the one 
that is closer to your own feelings.  Indicate your answer by selecting either the left or right 
bubble.  Please do not skip any items. 
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Below, you will make 10 hypothetical decision. Each decision is a paired choice between 
"Option A" and "Option B". Each option corresponds with a lottery. The outcome of the lottery 
is determined by the roll of a 10-sided die (all sides have the same probability of facing upwards 
after the die is rolled). The faces are numbered from 1 to 10, and whatever number that is facing 
upwards will determine your (hypothetical) payoff. 
 
For example, look at the first decision.  Option A will award you $2 if the die lands on 1, and 
$1.60 if the die lands on 2-10.  That means there is a 1/10 chance you will receive $2 and a 9/10 
chance you will receive $1.60.  Option B is different; it pays $3.85 if the die lands on 1, and 
$0.10 otherwise. Your choice is to pick between these two options. 
 
 
